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Article
Conscience in Commerce: Conceptualizing
Discrimination in Public Accommodations
AMY J. SEPINWALL
According to much current law and theory, a public accommodation that offers a
good or service to one customer cannot refuse to provide that same good or service to
another patron simply because of the latter’s identity. Thus, in many jurisdictions,
reception hall owners must rent their spaces to both a Black Baptist Church and the
Christian Identity KKK, wedding vendors must sell their goods to a marrying couple no
matter the sex of the couple’s members, and foster parent agencies must serve same- and
opposite-sex parenting duos alike. Call the principle underpinning this policy the
“Equal Access” principle: The principle holds that a vendor can choose the products
he sells but not the customers he serves; equally, a public service agency can choose its
portfolio but not its patrons. The principle lies at the core of recent cases in which
religion and sexual orientation, or religion and gender identity, have clashed in public
accommodations, and it is pervasive among commentators who seek to ensure that the
retail sphere—whether commercial or charitable—remains a discrimination-free zone.
This Article champions the egalitarian spirit of Equal Access, but it argues that the
principle itself is unworkable, unreliable, and perhaps even incoherent. Equal Access
permits impermissible discrimination and forbids refusals of service that in fact promote
equality’s ends. Further, Equal Access derives support from a problematic conception
of the retail sphere—one that sees commerce as amoral and so cannot even make sense
of a vendor’s interest in exercising their conscience at work.
In place of this morally neutered conception, this Article aims to vindicate a picture
of the marketplace as richly moral. And in place of Equal Access, this Article aims to
offer a more principled and nuanced account of when and why retail discrimination is
impermissible. That account would forbid identity-based discrimination but permit
refusals of service for projects that foster hate toward protected groups, even where the
hate-based project is intimately linked to a protected characteristic (as with religious
groups that mandate white supremacy). Far from perpetuating discrimination, these
refusals instead promote anti-discrimination norms, and they help realize the vision of
the morally inflected marketplace that this Article defends.
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Conscience in Commerce: Conceptualizing
Discrimination in Public Accommodations
AMY J. SEPINWALL *
INTRODUCTION
No one should be denied service at a place of public accommodation
because of who they are. Patrons should not be kicked out of Starbucks
because they are Black,1 couples should not be denied landscape gardening
services because they are gay,2 transgender people should not be removed
from restaurants for using the restroom corresponding to their gender
identity;3 and a parent should not be denied the opportunity to foster a child
because they happen to be married to someone of the same sex.4
The prevailing approach to preventing discrimination of this kind
imposes a categorical ban on refusing service to anyone. As Justice Elena
Kagan has stated, “[a] vendor can choose the products he sells, but not the

*
J.D., Ph.D. (Philosophy). Associate Professor, Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to audiences at Princeton, UCLA, Duke, St. John’s,
and the University of Pennsylvania, as well as the Annual Law and Religion Roundtable, for helpful
questions and comments on this draft, and at Yale for reactions to an earlier related paper. I also extend
special gratitude to Nicolas Cornell, Chris Lund, Larry Sager, Elizabeth Sepper, Seana Shiffrin, Amanda
Shanor, Andy Siegel, Joseph Singer, Nelson Tebbe, and David Velleman for very helpful exchanges and
suggestions. Autumn Dunn provided excellent research assistance.
1
Anna Orso, One Year Later: A Timeline of Controversy and Progress Since the Starbucks Arrests
Seen ’round the World, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/starbucksincident-philadelphia-racial-bias-one-year-anniversary-stutter-dilworth-park-homeless-tables20190412.html.
2
Gay Couple in Georgia Denied Service by Landscaper: “I Always Turn Them Down”, GA.
UNITES AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, https://georgiaunites.org/gay-couple-in-georgia-denied-service-bylandscaper-i-always-turn-them-down/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2020); Rhuaridh Marr, Atlanta Landscaper
Refused to Work for Gay Couple Due to Their "Perverse" Marriage, METRO WKLY. (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.metroweekly.com/2018/08/atlanta-landscaper-refused-to-work-for-gay-couple-due-totheir-perverse-marriage/.
3
Justin Wm. Moyer, D.C. Restaurant Fined $7,000 After Asking Transgender Woman for ID
Before Letting Her Use Bathroom,
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2019, 5:12 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-news/dc-restaurant-fined-7000-after-asking-transgenderwoman-for-id-before-letting-her-use-bathroom/2019/01/17/00d1fc6e-1a86-11e9-afe17bd2532c9988_story.html. Cf. Branson LB, I Got Kicked Out of a YMCA Locker Room—Twice—
Because I’m Trans, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 30, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/arti
cle/bransonlb/i-got-kicked-out-of-a-ymca-locker-room-twice-because-im. (detailing the author’s
exclusion from a YMCA locker room without consequences).
4
This is the question at the heart of a case pending before the Supreme Court, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 19-123, which I discuss below. See infra text accompanying notes 117–19, as well as
Section III.B.
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customers he serves—no matter the reason.”5 Commentators adopt the same
absolutist policy, maintaining, for example, that one who “puts out a sign”
or holds himself out to the public as a place of public accommodation open
for customers is bound to accept everyone.6 The policy has been decisive in
ruling against wedding vendors in all but one of the cases where the vendors
have sought exemptions from anti-discrimination laws in their bids to deny
service to same-sex couples.7 And it stands to play a role in the Supreme
Court’s pending decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, in which Catholic
Social Services seeks an exemption from Philadelphia’s law prohibiting
discrimination in public accommodations.8
While a categorical approach has worthy egalitarian aims, it threatens to
rule out conscientious refusals of service that should evoke our sympathy,
and perhaps even our support. Consider the restaurateur who announced, in
the wake of the Orlando nightclub shootings, that owners of assault rifles
were not welcome at her establishments;9 or the owner of the Red Hen
restaurant, who ejected Sarah Huckabee Sanders, former press secretary for
President Trump, because Sanders had defended the President’s policy of

5
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1733 n.* (2018) (Kagan, J.,
concurring). See also Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 (Colo. App. 2015)
(explaining that a store may not “refuse services to Craig and Mullins that it otherwise offers to the
general public”).
6
Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1410 (1996) [hereinafter Singer, No Right]. See also Steven J. Heyman, A
Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage,
14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 88 (2015) (“[A]n enterprise that offers to serve the public becomes part of
the social realm of commerce. Such an enterprise properly can be regarded as a place of public
accommodation with a duty to serve everyone.”). Other prominent scholars have approvingly cited
Singer’s “holding out” conception. Singer, No Right, supra at 1410. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Religion
and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 25, 52–58 (2015); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1225
(2014); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J.F. 201, 213 n. 53 (2018); Elizabeth Sepper, Religious Exemptions,
Harm to Others, and the Indeterminacy of a Common Law Baseline, 106 KY. L.J. 661, 666–67 (2018).
See also infra note 173 and accompanying text (collecting other sources and tracing the history of the position).
7
See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV.
132, 133 n.2 (2018) (collecting cases on denial of service to same-sex couples). Wedding vendors have
prevailed in only one case thus far, involving a business that produces custom-made wedding invitations.
See, e.g., Daniel Avery, Outrage After Court Says Wedding Invitation Makers Can Refuse Gay Couples:
‘A License to Discriminate’, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 17, 2019, 9:49 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/arizonawedding-invitation-gagy-supreme-court-1459627. For an overview of public accommodations statutes,
see infra notes 39 & 74.
8
See Brief for City Respondents at 2, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19-123 (Aug. 13, 2020)
(“[CSS] has insisted that the Constitution entitles it to . . . perform government services . . . while
disregarding a contractual obligation that every other foster family care agency must follow.”).
9
See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Restaurant Owner Spurns Those Who Are O.K. With AR-15s, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/us/think-ar-15s-are-ok-this-restaurantowner-doesnt-want-your-business.html. For a similar effort, consider In SEO, an internet company
whose owner announced that the company would no longer do business with any Trump supporters. See
Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Can Businesses Refuse to Serve—or Employ—Trump Supporters?, WASH.
POST (Nov. 25, 2016, 8:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/1
1/25/can-businesses-refuse-to-serve-or-employ-trump-supporters/.
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separating immigrant children from their parents;10 or the high-powered
corporations that refused to do business in North Carolina after it passed its
infamous “bathroom bill.”11 Egalitarians should condemn the baker who
refuses to provide a cake for a same-sex wedding.12 But what about a
different baker who refuses to provide a cake for a religiously-mandated
marriage between a middle-aged man and a non-consenting teenage girl?13
And while we should insist on people’s right to wear “Black Lives Matter”
shirts,14 what about similar pressure to protect the rights of those who want
to wear white supremacist paraphernalia?15
There are distinctions to be made in the foregoing cases—ones that
would prohibit identity-based discrimination while also protecting
businesses’ rights to deny their products to individuals or groups promoting
oppression or hate.16 The problem that this Article seeks to address is that
the two main approaches in law and theory to preventing discrimination
cannot yield these distinctions. Instead, these approaches issue a blanket
prohibition on turning patrons away, thereby requiring, for example, that one
serve the Black rights advocate and Christian Identity KKK member alike.17
10
Avi Selk & Sarah Murray, The Owner of the Red Hen Explains Why She Asked Sarah Huckabee
Sanders to Leave, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018, 5:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local
/wp/2018/06/23/why-a-small-town-restaurant-owner-asked-sarah-huckabee-sanders-to-leave-andwould-do-it-again/.
11
Emery P. Dalesio & Jonathan Drew, AP Exclusive: 'Bathroom Bill' to Cost North Carolina
$3.76B, AP NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://apnews.com/e6c7a15d2e16452c8dcbc2756fd67b44/APExclusive:-'Bathroom-bill'-to-cost-North-Carolina-$3.76B.
12
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720 (2018); Klein v. Or. Bureau
Lab. & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713, 2713 (2019); Cf. State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1209
(Wash. 2019) (answering the Supreme Court’s question posed by Klein—whether the Washington Courts
violated the Constitution’s guaranty of religious neutrality—in the negative); Elane Photography, LLC
v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013) (citing to the Supreme Court’s decisions declining to adopt a
distinction between status and conduct for refusing to serve same-sex couples).
13
One might think such things happen only in dystopian fiction. See, e.g., MARGARET ATWOOD,
THE TESTAMENTS 387 (2019) (portraying religiously motivated marriages between a middle-aged man
and a non-consenting teenage girl). But in fact these marriages are legal in all but three states. See, e.g.,
Julie Zauzmer, Some Religious Groups Allow Courtship of Underage Girls, DURANGO HERALD (Nov.
18, 2017, 6:18 AM), https://durangoherald.com/articles/195498 (discussing the prevalence of the legality
of such marriages). I elaborate on the laws around underage marriage in what follows. See infra notes
154–57 & 182–84.
14
In 2016, Savannah police were called to eject four Black individuals quietly sitting through
services at the Bible Baptist Church wearing Black Lives Matters (BLM) T-shirts, in silent protest of the
church’s decision to fire a daycare worker for wearing a BLM shirt to work. Beatrice DuPuy, Black Lives
Matter Member Plans to Sue Georgia Church for Discrimination After It Banned Group, NEWSWEEK
(Nov. 16, 2017, 6:42 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/black-lives-matter-members-kicked-out-church713892.
15
Restaurant Violated Rights of Swastika Wearers, Judge Rules, AP NEWS (Mar. 11, 1988),
https://apnews.com/72b0d6ccf7eed17f12b015df835fc60e.
16
I identify this as the key distinction and advance an account of permissible refusals of service on
this basis, in Part III, infra.
17
See, e.g., Fighting for White Rights for Over 140 Years, WHITE CAMELIA KNIGHTS OF THE KU
KLUX KLAN, http://www.wckkkk.org/identity.html (last visited July 29, 2020) (describing what it means
to be a “Christian Identity Klan” and drawing upon biblical support for the KKK’s (purported) white
supremacy). Cf. Fox v. Washington, 949 F.3d 270 (6th Cir. 2020) (reversing and remanding a district
court decision holding that a prison that refused to provide Christian Identity inmates with a space free of
“non-white” inmates for their worship did not violate Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act).
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Or, as Douglas Laycock approvingly writes, “The same public accommodations
law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation also
prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion . . . [even if the] religious
belief and practice is extreme and offensive.”18
The first of these blanket approaches denies that a business owner has
any reason to care about the identity of their customers or the projects to
which they will put the business’s goods. The approach might be captured
in the adage pecunia non olet (“money does not smell/taint”).19 On this view,
market transactions are inherently amoral, so vendors cannot be complicit in
the uses to which customers put their goods or services.20 As such, it can
never be immoral to provide service; it can only be immoral to deny it.
To see that conceiving of the market as amoral is potentially perverse,
return to the example of the non-consensual, but religiously dictated,
underage marriage. If you bake a wedding cake in your home that you gift
to the couple, then you have troublingly endorsed the marriage. Earn money
from selling a cake for that same marriage at your bakeshop and you have
not; after all, the thinking goes, it is just business.
The second approach is ecumenical about the role of conscience in the
market but strictly egalitarian as regards individual customers. On this
approach, a store may not sell a particular good to one person and then refuse
to sell that same good to a different person.21 Or again a public service
agency may not offer a particular service (e.g., foster placement) to one set
of clients but not another, at least where the only difference between the two

18

Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 55 (2018).
See, e.g., Tim Worstall, Pecunia Non Olet, FORBES (July 27, 2011, 9:48 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2011/07/27/pecunia-non-olet/#e7edcc412737 (using the
phrase pecunia non olet to question the rejection of money from a questionable source); Ruben George
Oliven, The Money Rhetoric in the United States, in ECONOMIC PERSUASIONS 167 (Steven Gudeman,
ed., 2009) (discussing the American proverb “[m]oney doesn’t smell”); Carly Silver, ‘Pecunia Non Olet’:
How a Roman Emperor Revived the Government with a Urine Tax, ALL THAT’S INTERESTING (July 2,
2019), https://allthatsinteresting.com/pecunia-nonolet.
20
This conception of business was decisive in the lower courts in the Affordable Care Act
contraceptive mandate challenges. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Hum. Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom; Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (concluding that secular corporations do not have the
same right to free exercise of religion that churches do). It is also a fixture in commentary seeking to
protect individual rights to service in the retail sphere. See, e.g., supra note 6; infra Section I.B.
21
This was just Justice Kagan’s thought in Masterpiece. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1733–34 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (criticizing the baker’s decision to
not serve a cake that they would have served another couple). Or, as Justice Gorsuch put the operating
principle, “the fact that [the baker] would make [a particular wedding cake] for some means he must
make [that cake] for all.” Id. at 1737–38 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). It is worth noting that it was on this
very ground that Colorado had ruled against the baker in Masterpiece, ordering him to provide “samesex couples . . . any product [he] would sell to heterosexual couples.” Id. at 1726 (internal citations
omitted). See also id. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The fact that [the baker] might sell other cakes
and cookies to gay and lesbian customers was irrelevant. . . . What matters is that [he] would not provide
a good or service to a same-sex couple that he would provide to a heterosexual couple.”). For theorists
who support Equal Access, see supra note 6 and infra notes 70–72.
19
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tracks an identity-based characteristic.22 Call this approach “Equal Access.”
Proponents of Equal Access imagine that it can be adequately protective of
conscience since it allows store owners to determine the goods they sell. As
such, the law cannot, for example, compel a baker to produce a cake with a
biblical message decrying homosexuality for a religious patron if the baker
would not produce any cake with a message decrying homosexuality for a
secular patron.23 But this approach is not nearly as discerning as one might
hope. For it would also compel the baker to sell his wares for a KKK
banquet, just as it would have required PayPal to continue transacting with
North Carolina businesses notwithstanding PayPal’s opposition to that
state’s “bathroom bill,”24 since PayPal was presumably not boycotting states
with more liberal bathroom policies. So too Equal Access would forbid
foster agencies from excluding families who oppose homosexuality on
religious grounds, no matter the sexual orientation of the foster child.25
Worse still, Equal Access may in fact permit instances of discrimination
that should be impermissible—in particular, those where the excluded party
has no relevant counterpart. For example, if a restaurant requires every
patron to use the bathroom corresponding to the sex they were assigned at
birth, to whom can transgender patrons point to establish their unequal
treatment? This problem becomes acute in the case of custom-made
products. If a vendor’s products are highly unique, then the vendor never
makes the same product twice. As such, he can completely evade Equal
Access. No wonder the key businesses seeking to deny service to same-sex
couples offer highly customizable wares—floral arrangements,26
photography services,27 wedding invitations,28 and wedding cakes.29 And in
the highly fact-sensitive context of foster family certification,30 a similar

22
This is just how the Respondents in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia characterize the nature of the
discrimination that CSS would enact. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 78, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 19–123 (Nov. 4, 2020) (Neal Katyal arguing) (“Basically, CSS has said they will not
permit LGBT couples to be part of their screening process. So, if you're a married gay couple, . . . the
doors are closed to you, but not to a -- not to a heterosexual couple.”).
23
William Jack, a fundamentalist Christian customer who was turned away by a baker, sought a
cake with a message communicating animus toward gays and lesbians. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138
S. Ct. at 1719, 1732. The cake in the Masterpiece case, by contrast, did not convey a message whose aim
was to denigrate religion. The couple wanted a cake celebrating their marriage. Id. at 1724. I elaborate
on the distinction between the two cake commissions below. See infra Section II.A.
24
‘Bathroom Bill’ to Cost North Carolina $3.76 Billion, CNBC (Mar. 27, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/27/bathroom-bill-to-cost-north-carolina-376-billion.html.
25
See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
26
State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019).
27
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013).
28
Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 F.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
29
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018); Klein v. Or.
Bureau Lab. & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. App. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated. But cf. Gifford
v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (denying wedding venue owner’s religious
freedom challenge to New York’s public accommodations law).
30
See infra Section III.B.
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problem arises: no two families are alike so again the discriminating agency
can never be accused of failing to treat likes alike.
Commentators have contributed to a burgeoning, although still
relatively new,31 literature about whether religious freedom or freedom of
expression confers a right upon a business to be exempt from antidiscrimination norms.32 This Article critiques the conceptualization of the
norms themselves. I argue that the categorical approach, enshrined in Equal
Access, relies on an unappealing vision of the retail sphere, and it yields
results that frustrate egalitarian aims. Insofar as Equal Access is the bedrock
of public accommodations laws, those laws stand in need of a new
foundation, which is just what this Article aims to provide.
In Part I, I lay bare the conceptual underpinnings of Equal Access—
namely, a view of commerce as amoral and complicity-free. This is the first
strategy for ensuring access for all: if it is all just business, then vendors have
no reason to care about who buys their wares and for what ends. Further, one
sees this commitment to amorality not only in the profane realm of the
market but even in the eleemosynary space of public services, where a
consumerist orientation has taken hold, as I shall argue. In response to this
view, I contend that we need not eschew morality in the marketplace in order
to block exemptions from anti-discrimination laws.
In Part II, I turn to the second strategy for ensuring Equal Access—
enforcement of the principle itself. I aim to show that Equal Access not only
compels vendors to contribute to projects they have reason to oppose, it also
exposes customers with protected characteristics to the very discrimination
that it is supposed to prevent.
Part III offers an alternative to Equal Access. There, I advance a policy
for public accommodations that can secure equality while also
accommodating some vendor claims of conscience. In particular, I focus on
cases where a would-be customer seeks the vendor’s goods or services for a
project involving hate or oppression. I argue that the vendor need not lend
herself or her work to such projects, and I suggest that one might, on this
ground, distinguish between a religious business owner’s refusal to provide,
say, wedding cakes to LGBTQ patrons (impermissible, on the account
31
See Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L.J. 78, 85 n.22 (2019) (noting
“state public accommodations law has received far less attention from legal scholars until recently”).
32
See, e.g., NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 115, 138 (2017). For
more on conscientious refusals to serve same-sex couples, see Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech
Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125 (2016); Steven J.
Heyman, A Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and SameSex Marriage, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2015); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015);
Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense
of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595 (2018); Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage,
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318 (2018); Angela C. Carmella, When Businesses Refuse to Serve for Religious
Reasons: Drawing Lines Between “Participation” and “Endorsement” in Claims of Moral Complicity,
69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1593 (2017); Kyle C. Velte, All Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to
Defeating the Religious Right’s Challenges to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2016).
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advanced here) and the secular business owner’s refusal to provide a
religious customer with a cake (even a generic cake) that they will serve at
an event decrying homosexuality (permissible).
Part IV aims to buttress the positive account against a possible objection:
because the account would have the state permit discrimination against
particular viewpoints, one might worry about state action. For example, if
the state compels a printer to produce leaflets for a NAACP event but not
for a Christian KKK event, is the state impermissibly discriminating on the
basis of race or impermissibly promoting some viewpoints while thwarting
others? Part IV is devoted to establishing that there is no state action here.
The final part concludes.
I. MORALITY IN THE MARKET
“Complicit” was named the word of the year for 2017,33 which fittingly
ended with oral argument in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado.34 In that
case, the Court confronted the question of whether retail owners enjoy a
so-called right to discriminate on conscientious grounds.35 While the Court
declined to answer that question, it nonetheless hinted at a resolution.36 The
Court acknowledged “religious and philosophical objections to gay
marriage” but contended that in general, “such objections do not allow
business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny
protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and
generally applicable public accommodations law.”37 The Court has

33
Amy B. Wang, ‘Complicit’ is the 2017 Word of the Year, According to Dictionary.com, WASH.
POST (Nov. 27, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/11/27/
complicit-is-the-2017-word-of-the-year-according-to-dictionary-com/.
34
Transcript of Oral Argument, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111) (indicating that
oral argument was heard in December 2017).
35
Christopher W. Schmidt, Yes, There Is a Right to Discriminate, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2017, 6:00
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/12/05/yes-there-is-a-right-todiscriminate/; Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Is There a Constitutional Right for a Business to Not
Serve Customers?, ABA J. (Nov. 30, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/is_ther
e_a_constitutional_right_for_a_business_to_not_serve_customers.
36
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. While the Court seemed to lean against a policy that would grant
exemptions from public accommodations laws, id., it nonetheless found in favor of the store owner on
the narrow ground that he had not received a fair hearing in the courts below. The Court clearly remains
loath to weigh in on these issues, remanding two subsequent wedding vendor cases to ensure they were
not infected by the religious bias the Court had found in Masterpiece. See Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v.
Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (remanding the case to the Supreme Court of Washington); Klein v.
Or. Bureau Lab. & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (remanding case to the Court of Appeals of Oregon).
37
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. The Court allowed that there might be a narrow range of cases
in which the law could not compel a vendor’s service—viz., those in which the good or service sought
involved speech. See id. at 1723 (“If a baker refused to design a special cake with words or images
celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing words with religious meaning—that might be
different from a refusal to sell any cake at all.”). I argue elsewhere that the distinction between expressive
and non-expressive goods and services is misbegotten. Amy J. Sepinwall, Free Speech and Off-Label
Rights, 54 GA. L. REV. 463, 473 (2020).
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prohibited race-based denials of service on precisely this ground,38 and all
state public accommodations laws, as well as Title II of the Civil Rights Act,
do so as well.39
The Court’s skepticism about conscientious exemptions from public
accommodations laws finds an echo in scholarship. Commentators keen to
prohibit discrimination argue that it matters little whether the store owner
bears the kind of connection that would, outside of the marketplace, render
him complicit in his customers’ projects, for the marketplace is a
conscience-free zone.40 One engages in market transactions with one and
only one principle: self-interest, narrowly construed.41 Beyond a very basic
set of moral rules aimed at ensuring property rights and fair play, morality
has no place.42 The market is instead “[t]he archetype of the profane.”43
Relying on this conception, Colorado argued in Masterpiece that freedom of
expressive association, which does permit some discrimination in non-profit

38
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 408 (1968). Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 378–79 (1967) (holding that a state constitutional amendment authorizing discrimination in
housing on any basis is not merely private action; instead, it involves the state in such a way as to make
the amendment a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
39
In general, Title II of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, or national origin in restaurants, hotels, gas stations, and places of entertainment. 42 U.S.C. §
2000a. But Title II does not protect against LGBTQ discrimination. Id. Cf. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 287 (2010)
(“Same-sex couples have no federal constitutional right to be free from discrimination, based on sexual
orientation, in the non-governmental provision of goods and services.”) (footnote omitted). Nor does
Title II apply to retail establishments like bakeries, flower shops, and clothing stores. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a;
Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of
Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 936 (2015) [hereinafter Singer, Sodom]. By contrast, about half of the states
include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in their public accommodations laws. Id. at 943.
Further, many states have adopted more capacious understandings of what constitutes a public
accommodation, applying their anti-discrimination provisions not only to businesses plausibly connected
to interstate travel and commerce (paradigmatically, hotels and restaurants) but to all retail
establishments. For critical overviews of public accommodations laws, see generally Nancy Leong &
Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy,
105 GEO. L.J. 1271 (2017). For information regarding LGBTQ protections in particular, see Elizabeth
Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 639 n.25
(2016). For an authoritative history of protections against sex-based discrimination in public
accommodations, see Sepper & Dinner, supra note 31.
40
See infra Section I.B.
41
See infra note 65. Cf. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND.
L.J. 981, 985 (2009) (“[A] firm has no freedom except to adopt ever more profitable techniques.”).
42
See, e.g., Shirley Woodward, Debt to Society: A Communitarian Approach to Criminal Antiprofit
Laws, 85 GEO. L.J. 455, 486 (1996) (“The market is an amoral venue that provides rewards and
incentives independently of the moral worth of the activity involved.”). For a description of the market
that draws out these features, see Eric W. Orts & Amy J. Sepinwall, Collective Goods and the Court: A
Theory of Constitutional Commodification, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 637 (2020).
43
Marjorie M. Shultz, Questioning Commodification, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1841, 1855 (1997)
(reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX,
CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS (1996)).
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organizations,44 is of no avail for “clearly commercial entities.”45 Moreover,
the notion of an amoral marketplace informs not just the retail sphere but
also an adjacent one—namely, the sphere of public services, especially when
carried out by private entities.46
This Part aims to show that commerce does not have the neutralizing
effects that courts and commentators impute to it. To that end, I address in
turn two ways commentators understand the market’s morality-washing.
Some commentators deny that providing goods or services to a customer
renders the vendor complicit in the project where the good or service will be
used.47 Others argue that the marketplace is not an arena where conscience
may take hold.48 So the vendor is not complicit either because he is not
connected to the customer’s project in the right way or because market
transactions immunize him from what would otherwise be an implicating
connection. Both of these strategies are wrongheaded. The first
misconceives complicity and the second misconceives the market. I address
each of them in turn.
A. Complicity in the Commercial Sphere
Conscience-based complicity claims are claims to be released from a
law that one opposes on religious or moral grounds.49 But why should
government confer “a private right to ignore [a] generally applicable

44
See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. V. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648–49 (2000) (applying this principle to
the Boy Scouts of America); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
563 (1995) (applying this principle to the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council). See Singer,
Sodom, supra note 39, at 939 (“Freedom of association is a bedrock constitutional principle but it is not
a basis for claiming a right to establish market structures that are premised on invidious discrimination.”).
45
Brief for Respondent Colo. C.R. Comm’n at 31, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 657).
See also Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 14–15, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16-111) (detailing the Court’s historic refusal to allow retail entities to discriminate, no
matter the source of the discriminatory motive (religion, freedom of association, etc.)). Cf. Kendrick &
Schwartzman, supra note 7, at 134 (implying that the “questions about the scope of civil rights laws and
the limits of First Amendment rights” that the wedding vendor cases raise have a special valence when
the protesting parties are “for-profit businesses”).
46
See Clare Kindall, Symposium: The First Amendment Does Not Require Governments to Contract
with Parties Who Do Not Comply with Neutral, Generally Applicable Rules, SCOTUSBLOG (OC. 29,
2020, 12:50 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-the-first-amendment-does-notrequire-governments-to-contract-with-parties-who-do-not-comply-with-neutral-generally-applicablerules/ (arguing that, in Fulton, “[t]he state is not regulating; it is participating in the market for a particular
service.”)
47
See infra Section I.A.
48
See infra Section I.B.
49
Melissa Murray has recently argued that there is more than a bid to protect conscience at work in
the wedding vendors’ complicity claims. She sees in them as well a bid “to reassert and enforce traditional
sexual mores that the state no longer enforces.” Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 832 (2018). I believe
that she accurately diagnoses the motives of particular wedding vendors. But I also allow that at least
some wedding vendors genuinely care only about protecting their own souls, with no further political
ends. My analysis contemplates only them.
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law[]”?50 Why defer to conscience at all? And if we are going to defer in
some cases, which criteria should we use to identify the appropriate ones?
Exemption opponents tend to operate with an objective conception of
complicity, according to which complicity assessments are the prerogative
of those who judge, not those who would bear the worrying connection.51
What matters then is whether the community would view a person as
implicated in someone else’s wrong, not whether the person would so view
themselves. As Michael Dorf puts it: “The Constitution does not protect
people from feeling complicit in what they regard as evil.”52
It is easy to see why, on an objective conception, one would deny that
store owners are complicit in their customers’ projects. When we judge
others, we rightfully require some kind of culpable connection to a wrong in
order to find them complicit in that wrong.53 In particular, we typically
require that they participate in the wrong, or help choose it, or belong to the
group on whose behalf it was performed.54
But the store owner who worries about his complicity in his customer’s
projects bears none of these connections to those projects. For example, a
vendor who bakes a cake for a wedding does not participate in the marriage,
have a role in the couple’s decision to marry, or even belong to a group that
can be said to be represented in the couple’s union. John Corvino puts the
point pithily when he writes, “people recognize that baking a wedding cake

50
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885– 86 (1990). Or, in the more florid words of Brian Leiter,
allowing for exemption on conscientious grounds “would appear to amount to a legalization of anarchy!”
—especially if, as Leiter believes, secular claims of conscience warrant no less respect than religious
ones. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 91 (2012).
51
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2798 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that, in assessing complicity claims, the Court must “distinguish[ ] between ‘factual
allegations that [plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature,’ which a court must accept as
true, and the ‘legal conclusion that . . . [plaintiffs’] religious exercise is substantially burdened,’ an inquiry
the court must undertake”) (citation omitted); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 701 n.6 (1986) (“[F]or the
adjudication of a [Free Exercise] constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather than an individual’s
religion, must supply the frame of reference.”).
52
Michael C. Dorf, The Troublingly Widening Gyre of Complicity Claims, VERDICT (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://verdict.justia.com/2017/11/01/troublingly-widening-gyre-complicity-claims.
An
objective
conception of complicity also animates the First Amendment Scholars’ amicus brief in Fulton v.
Philadelphia, when they suggest that it is “outlandish” for Catholic Social Services to worry that
Philadelphia would be compelling it to speak and act according to Philadelphia’s beliefs were it to abide
by Philadelphia’s non-discrimination law. See Brief of First Amendment Scholars As Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 26, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19–123 (Aug. 20, 2020).
53
See generally Amy J. Sepinwall, Faultless Guilt: Toward a Relationship-Based Account of
Criminal Liability, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521 (2017) (describing the conventional conception of
complicity and tracing its origins).
54
It was on just this basis that most lower courts denied that the contraceptive mandate made
employers complicit in their employees’ contraceptive use. See, e.g., Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850,
865 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“[A]n employer, by virtue of paying . . . for an employee’s
health care, does not become a party to the employee’s health care decisions.”). Cf. Autocam Corp. v.
Sebelius, NO. 1:12–CV–1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012) (“The mandate
does not compel the [owners] as individuals to do anything. They do not have to use or buy contraceptives
for themselves or anyone else.”).
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is not tantamount to participating in a marriage: If it were, there would be a
lot of polygamous bakers in the world.”55
There is nothing inherently problematic about an objective conception
of complicity. Indeed, that conception should govern when the state, or even
the moral community, is judging an individual’s guilt. Life would be
oppressive if we could be judged complicit for even the most tenuous
connections to others’ wrongs.56 The problem here is that the objective
conception makes no sense when applied to conscience-based complicity
claims, for these are fundamentally about an individual judging her own
guilt. It is no answer to say to the conscientious objector to a military draft,
“well, the state does not believe war is morally wrong,” or “don’t worry
about your conscience; you will just be cleaning the guns/cooking the meals,
etc.” A person cannot replace her own sense of right and wrong—or her own
sense of when she is sufficiently close to a wrong to be implicated in it—
with someone else’s. If it were reasonable to demand that she did, the state
would never offer conscientious exemptions. Why, then, does the state do so?
The answer, as I argue at greater length elsewhere, is that the state has
an obligation to protect individuals from the experience of acting against
conscience.57 Acting against conscience can be deeply painful; more than
that, it can be deeply violative of one’s integrity or self-conception.58 Being
compelled by law to do something one believes is wrong can also disable
one from actively condemning the wrong when others commit it; that is, it
can undermine one’s standing and authority to oppose the wrong, which is a
loss to the moral community as a whole.59
Since, in offering conscience-based exemptions from laws or policies,
we aim to respond to how the conscientious objector would feel were they
required to participate in another’s (putative) wrong, we cannot proceed
objectively. It makes no sense for us to substitute our sense of right and
wrong for theirs; nor does it make sense to super-impose our sense of the
kind or degree of connection necessary to “in fact” make one complicit.60
55
John Corvino,“Bake Me a Cake”: Three Paths for Balancing Liberty and Equality, WHAT’S
WRONG? (Oct. 15, 2015), https://whatswrongcvsp.com/2015/10/15/guest-post-from-john-corvino-bakeme-a-cake-three-paths-for-balancing-liberty-and-equality/.
56
Compare Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Complicity and Conditions of Agency, 35 J. APPLIED PHIL. 643,
643–44 (2018) (illustrating the tension in defining a more expansive understanding of complicity that
goes beyond intentionality and causality, but indicating that complicity should still require the agent to
be involved in the organization in question) with Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 289, 294–95 (2007) (arguing that the requirement that one make a causal difference is merely the
paradigmatic, but not the only, case of blameworthy complicity).
57
See generally Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for
Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015) [hereinafter
Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity].
58
Id. at 1957.
59
Nicolas Cornell & Amy Sepinwall, Complicity and Hypocrisy, 19 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 154, 166 (2020).
60
I argue elsewhere that complicity claims involve three dimensions: moral and relational (the two
factors I identify in the text) as well as factual. See generally Sepinwall, supra note 57 (utilizing these
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Instead, we have to allow that others may think some conduct wrongful even
if we see it as innocent; and they may think their contribution to wrongful
conduct morally implicating even if we might see that contribution as trivial
or tenuous enough to make no moral difference at all.
Once we recognize that conscience-based claims are necessarily
subjective, we can see the flaw in the claim that, say, a cake baker’s
contribution to a same-sex marriage is too tenuous to make the baker
complicit in the marriage or that the owner of the Red Hen should not have
viewed herself as implicated in the President’s immigration policies simply
by virtue of having fed his then-press secretary a meal. It does not matter
that we would not assign responsibility to the baker or the Red Hen owner
for serving the customers they did. What matters is that each of them takes
themselves to be implicated. And if we are to have a legal regime that at
least sometimes yields to an individual’s conscience, then we will need to
take seriously individuals’ concerns about complicity even if they do not
track the state’s (or the moral community’s) conception of right and wrong
or the state’s conception of what makes for a complicit connection.
With that said, to take a complicity claim seriously is not yet to conclude
that it should ground an exemption. Other considerations are relevant too,
including the costs to third parties of granting the exemption. But one
consideration that should not be relevant is the one on which proponents of
Equal Access rely—namely, that commerce is inherently amoral.
B. The Market as a Morality-Free Zone
The idea that the market insulates its participants from moral concerns
has figured prominently in the culture wars.61 For example, one
commissioner adjudicating the civil rights complaint against the baker in
Masterpiece Cakeshop suggested that the baker could “believe ‘what he
wants to believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs if he ‘decides to do
business in the state.’”62 And in Hobby Lobby, the Court contended with the
claim that for-profit corporations had no conscience rights “because the
purpose of such corporations is simply to make money.”63 That claim
appeared in the remarks of some commentators, lower court judges rejecting
other contraceptive mandate challenges, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting
three dimensions to assess the Hobby Lobby decision). While I maintain that respecting conscience
requires that we defer to the objector’s assessment of whether the conduct she opposes is morally wrong
and whether the contribution she challenges relates her to that wrong in a way that would make her
complicit, I deny that we must defer to her assessment of the facts.
61
See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding
Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241, 244 (2015) (“[T]he business context essentially neutralizes any potential
message of endorsement.”); supra notes 20 and 45 and accompanying text.
62
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018) (quoting the
hearing transcript).
63
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770 (2014) (footnote omitted). The
Court’s opinion refutes this claim by rehearsing the various conscientious initiatives businesses
undertake, oftentimes at a financial cost. Id. at 2771 n.24.
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opinion in Hobby Lobby.64 All subscribe to the thought—typically the
calling-card of efficiency theorists65—that businesses have one and only one
purpose: to maximize profits.66 This Section responds to this amoral,
avaricious picture of the marketplace, arguing that it provides cover and

64
E.g., Brief of Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Government at 25, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Jewish Social Policy Action Network in Support of the Government at 8–9, 14, Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354); Brief of Brennan Center for Justice
at N.Y.U. School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Government at 2, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014) (No. 13-354); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 13–1144, 2013 WL 1277419, at 4 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013) (Garth, J., concurring) (noting that
the mission of Conestoga, “like that of any other for-profit, secular business, is to make money in the
commercial sphere”) (citation omitted); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65
As Milton Friedman, the Chicago economist famously wrote, “there is one and only one social
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase profits. . . .”
MILTON FRIEDMAN WITH ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2002). This view has
been championed by many a law and economics scholar, to the point where Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman could triumphantly declare that “[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.” Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). For an overview
of the scholarly ascendancy of Friedman’s position, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law:
The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39 (2004).
While Friedman himself allowed that the law would and should constrain businesses, such that they
“engage[]
in
open
and
free
competition
without
deception
or
fraud,”
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedmandoctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html, some of his acolytes go even further than him,
arguing that managers might evade regulatory laws if doing so would enhance profits. See, e.g., Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155,
1168 n.36 (1982) (“Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating regulatory laws, when
violations are profitable to the firm . . . . We put to one side laws concerning violence or other acts thought
to be malum in se.” (citations omitted)). For a trenchant critique of this position, see Robert W.
Gordon, The Return of the Lawyer-Statesman?, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1746–50 (2017).
66
See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1547 (2012)
(arguing that “[w]ithin for-profit businesses, even though moral convictions might come into play, the
profit motive (in some cases, an obligation to maximize shareholder wealth) must drive
decisionmaking”); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (“We do not see how a for-profit artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law . . . that was created to make money could exercise . . . an inherently ‘human’
right.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir.
2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“So far as it appears, the mission of Grote Industries, like that of any other
for-profit, secular business, is to make money in the commercial sphere.”); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2796–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[R]eligious organizations exist to serve a community of believers.
For-profit corporations do not fit that bill. . . . [F]or- profit corporations are different from religious nonprofits in that they use labor to make a profit, rather than to perpetuate [the] religious value[s] [shared by
a community of believers].”) (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
For an excellent analysis demonstrating that, in Hobby Lobby, the Justices’ ideological positions shift,
with the progressive dissenters championing a capitalist vision of the market as amoral, see Nomi Maya
Stolzenberg, It’s About Money: The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 88 S. CAL. L.
REV. 727, 748 (2015).
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legitimation for unappealing business behavior and that it is at any rate
unnecessary to the end of securing equal consumer access.
1. The Amoral Marketplace Versus Business-with-Conscience
In many ways, the law marks out the marketplace as amoral. For
example, the Supreme Court has erected a distinction between expressive
and commercial enterprises, according to which profit-making cancels out
important First Amendment freedoms.67 In a similar vein, theorists have
contended that once one seeks a profit, one must “invariably” operate as a
public accommodation, open to all.68 The Court’s treatment of commercial
speech, which typically receives less protection than political speech or art,
also reflects a general suspicion about the capacity of the market to offer
anything of non-instrumental value.69 In short, in much law and scholarship,
the privilege of hanging out a shingle rightly comes at the cost of suspending
one’s conscience.70 Moreover, the shingle in question need not be that of a
business run for profit. It can include—as the anti-discrimination law

67

E.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Cf. id. at 636 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Once [an association chooses to] enter[] the
marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership
that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”). See also Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 39, at 285–86 (“Put more generally, a proposition crucial to religious liberty is that
religions, to maintain their integrity, must and do discriminate. . . . Commercial entities do not enjoy the
same protected interest in associational freedom . . .”). For a critique of the commercial/expressive divide,
see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law,
66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1230 (2014).
68
See, e.g., Sepper, supra note 39, at 646 (“[P]rofit motive invariably identifies a place as a public
accommodation.”).
69
For a long time, commercial speech was taken to be outside the First Amendment altogether.
While commercial speech is often crass, self-serving, and obfuscating, it nonetheless can serve valuable
social ends, as the Court eventually recognized. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975)
(protecting advertisement informing women about health centers willing to provide abortions). In an
early case extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech, the Court noted that “[t]he
relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the
marketplace of ideas.” Id. at 826. See also Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market
Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 322 (2007) (recognizing the value in having “those who farm
organically for moral and political reasons” convey that information so that similarly minded buyers can
distinguish organic and conventional products).
70
See, e.g., supra note 6. This view figured prominently in the amicus briefs of those supporting
the gay couple’s right to a wedding cake in Masterpiece Cakeshop. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Public
Accommodation Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at 7, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017) (“The common law history supports a right of
equal access to businesses serving the public…. A business that met this definition could not exclude any
member of the public without good cause.”); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents, 138 S. Ct. 1719, No. 16-1111 (Oct. 30, 2017) (“business owners who offer
their goods and services to the public cannot claim constitutional sanctuary from public accommodations
laws”). It can also be found in the amicus briefs of those opposing Catholic Social Services’ bid for an
exemption in Fulton. See, e.g., Brief of First Amendment Scholars in Support of Respondents at 17,
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19–123 (Aug. 20, 2020) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
261 (1982), for the proposition that “[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity
as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are
not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”).
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challenged in Fulton v. Philadelphia does—any entity open to the public,71
under an understanding of the “marketplace” that covers retail businesses
and public service agencies alike.72
It is undoubtedly true that public accommodations laws prohibiting
discrimination have worthy aims. To rehearse them briefly here, these laws
prevent the material harms that exclusion would inflict—for example, the
expense of time and money to locate a willing purveyor, or worse still the
complete denial of certain goods and services. They also protect individuals
from the dignitary harm of being turned away,73 and they express the state’s
commitment to equality.74 Equal Access has additional benefits for all—for
example, it “secure[s] the state against domestic strife and unrest, [and]
preserve[s] the public safety, health, and general welfare.”75 Finally, some
states and commentators adduce a democracy-reinforcing rationale for
public accommodations laws,76 since citizens who find that they have been
recruited into a society that does not offer them fair terms of cooperation
might well disengage,77 or even turn to antisocial means of attaining the
goods that the existing distribution has unfairly denied them.78
Notice, however, that the reasons for public accommodations laws lose
none of their force if we abandon the vision of the market as morally
neutered. We need not rule out the possibility, let alone the legitimacy, of
conscientious commitments on the part of business owners in order to ensure
the full operation of public accommodations laws. To see this, consider first
that many of the moral commitments market players seek to enact are
compatible with, and sometimes even supportive of, the egalitarian and
dignitary goals of public accommodations laws. When a store owner hangs
a rainbow sign in her window, or declines to sell anything but fair-trade
goods, or offers to pay well above minimum wage for what would typically
be a minimum-wage position, cutting into her own profit margins as a result,

71
See PHILA. CODE § 9-1102(w) (2020) (public accommodations include “services . . . extended,
offered, . . . or otherwise made available to the public” as well as “all . . . services provided by . . . the
City, its departments, boards and commissions.”); id. § 9-1106 (prohibition on discrimination).
72
See Brief for City Respondents at 6, Fulton, No. 19–123.
73
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (“[T]he
fundamental object of [the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] was to
vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments.’”) (quoting Senate Committee Report).
74
Sepper, supra note 39, at 664 n.162; Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious
Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 627–28 (2015).
75
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.01 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Reg. Sess. Of the 26th Leg.).
See Sepper, supra note 39, at 664 n.162 (2016) (collecting other statutes with similar language).
76
See Sepper, supra note 39, at 664 (collecting other statutes with similar language).
77
Cf. Iris Marion Young, Political Responsibility and Structural Injustice, in LINDLEY LECTURE
SERIES 1–3 (2003), https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/sociology/pdf/Political
Responsibility.pdf.
78
See, e.g., DANIEL HART & JAMES YOUNISS, RENEWING DEMOCRACY IN YOUNG AMERICA 44
(2018) (mentioning French riots against lack of educational opportunity).
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she is enacting commitments to social justice and equality at least consonant
with those underpinning public accommodations laws.
Second, a morally neutered conception of the market is pernicious in its
own right, and we should pause to consider why. That conception invites
moral complacency, if not worse.79 It presupposes an atomism that both
licenses self-interest and also overlooks much moralized market activity.80
Take, for example, Ann Verrill, a Portland, Maine, restaurateur who, in the
aftermath of the Orlando nightclub killings, posted a message on Facebook
stating that individuals who owned assault rifles of the kind used in the
massacre were not welcome at her restaurant.81 Of course, she might by law
have had to serve them anyway, but she needn’t have made them feel
welcome.82 Or again, consider that the clothing company Patagonia imposes
an “Earth tax” on itself, donating a portion of its revenues in the form of
grants for environmental activism because, “[a]s a company that uses
resources and produces waste, [they] recognise [their] impact on the
environment and feel a responsibility to give back.”83 In January 2020,
British Airways voluntarily cancelled all of its direct flights to and from
mainland China to prevent international transmission of the coronavirus.
The cancellations presumably came at a significant cost to the airline,84 but,
as it explained, the “‘safety of our customers and crew is always our

79
Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 69, at 325 (“I’m not sure it is wise or desirable to adopt a theory that if
publicly known, accepted, and implemented would not only treat market actors as amoral, but would
encourage market actors—whether producers, advertisers, or consumers—to adopt this as a selfconception (that is, to think of themselves as amoral, apolitical agents.)”).
80
On atomism in the market, see Orts & Sepinwall, supra note 42, at 648–49. For examples of
conscientious market activity, see infra text accompanying notes 81–86; Giuseppe Danese, Woke Capital
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). See generally Ronald K.L. Collins & David M.
Skover, Pissing in the Snow: A Cultural Approach to the First Amendment, 45 STAN. L. REV. 783, 806
(1993) (reviewing JAMES B. TWITCHELL, CARNIVAL CULTURE: THE TRASHING OF TASTE IN AMERICA
(1992)) (recounting how the profit motive has eviscerated the discourse that the First Amendment was
designed to protect, replacing it with “mass media” in the most literal sense of that term). There may
be much truth in a critique like Collins and Skover’s, but it is also bleakly cynical, and so perhaps
overly apologetic.
81
Seelye, supra note 9.
82
Would Verrill have been permitted to convey her outrage in ways that caused patrons to leave,
thereby achieving the result of excluding them? For an exploration of the limits of hostile speech within
a commercial establishment, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1824 (1992).
83
Growing the Grassroots, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/au/pages/environmentalgrants (last visited Aug. 8, 2020). Merck Pharmaceuticals famously produces and gives away at no cost
a drug whose sole purpose is to cure river blindness in a population that has no ability to pay for the drug
itself. See Merck Offers Free Distribution of New River Blindness Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1987),
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/22/world/merck-offers-free-distribution-of-new-river-blindnessdrug.html; Over 30 Years: The Mectizan Donation Program, MERCK (Dec. 1, 2019), http://www.merck
.com/about/featured-stories/mectizan.html (describing Merck’s program through to the present day).
84
Cf. Sylvan Lane, Stocks Slide After U.S. Airlines Cancel Service to China Over Coronavirus,
THE HILL (Jan. 31, 2020, 11:46 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/480886-stocks-slide-after-usairlines-cancel-service-to-china-over-coronavirus.
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priority.’”85 These practices suggest that a good number of businesses do not
think of themselves as working in an amoral sphere; instead, they
authentically subscribe to an ethic of “doing well and doing good.”86
Moreover, there may be instrumental reasons to promote a vision of
business as morally inflected, rather than morally neutered. We can conceive
of businesses as rapacious and amoral, and public accommodations laws as
a necessary corrective. On that conception, businesses may well live down
to our expectations.87 Or we can conceive of businesses as sensitive and
oftentimes responsive to moral considerations, driven to forego maximal
profit or even sometimes to incur losses for the sake of some moral objective.
On the latter view, public accommodations laws could then be seen as a
backstop for the business bad apples; better still, they might be seen as
continuous with the ethos that underpins the good business itself.88
Call the model of business advanced here “business-with-conscience.”
While that model acknowledges and celebrates morally responsive business
practices, it is not meant to sound market triumphalism. Business-withconscience, at least as it is currently instantiated, will hardly cure capitalist
markets of their unfair distributive consequences,89 the pressures they
impose to produce too much, too cheaply, wreaking too much harm on the

85
Rosie Perper, British Airways Cancels All Flights to Mainland China as Wuhan Coronavirus
Spreads, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 29, 2020, 2:43 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/british-airwayscancels-all-flights-to-china-wuhan-coronavirus-2020-1.
86
E.g., Jeff Swartz, Doing Well and Doing Good: The Business Community and National Service,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 1, 2002), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/doing-well-and-doing-good-thebusiness-community-and-national-service/ (describing Timberland’s efforts to promote volunteer work
and public service). Cf. Sabine Tsuruda, Volunteer Work, Inclusivity, and Social Equality, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LAW 306, 311–12 (Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester & Virginia
Mantouvalou eds., 2018) (rejecting the idea that civic and humanitarian aims can be the province only of
volunteer work, rather than paid employment) (footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
87
Cf. Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less Than Ideal Legal World, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 973, 974 (1999) (“[J]ustice is not going to be the miraculous product of a system in which none of
the actors are required to pursue it.”).
88
There is some thought that businesses are of necessity maximally profit-driven, not only because
their survival requires as much, see Baker, supra note 41, at 985, but also as a matter of fiduciary
obligation to their shareholders. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 23, 23 (1991) (stating that corporations and their directors “owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders and to shareholders alone”). But the view that managers must run the firm exclusively, or
even primarily, in the interests of shareholders is contestable. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-SoBad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002) (challenging arguments
in favor of shareholder primacy that are “as a positive matter, inaccurate, incorrect, and unpersuasive to
the careful and neutral observer”). Moreover, even if true, the assumption that shareholders themselves
care only about profits reproduces the same presumptions about amorality that the conception of morallyinflected business practices advanced here aims to displace.
89
See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014) (“When the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and income. . .
capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the
meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based.”).
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environment,90 or most of the other ills for which they are rightly criticized.91
Still, there is no point in denying that businesses can and sometimes do good.
The morally neutered view of the market that exemption opponents advance
is not necessarily accurate, certainly not unavoidable, and perhaps not even
helpful to the progressive egalitarian agenda.92
With that said, one might concede that it is all to the good if a business
adheres to higher moral standards than the law requires—for example, by
holding itself to greener practices than current environmental regulations
mandate. But the cases where store owners want to discriminate for
conscience-based reasons involve deviating downward from what the law
(and arguably political morality) requires by refusing equal treatment for the
sake of the owners’ personal commitments. Is it nothing but rhetorical
sleight of hand to trumpet these store owners as paragons of moral conscience?
2. Common Carriers and Discrimination
One way to motivate the thought that no form of discrimination can
count as conscientious emerges from Joseph Singer’s path-breaking work
recovering and reconceptualizing public accommodations law. Singer offers
a fascinating discussion of the historic origins of this body of law, pitting a
“monopoly” explanation against a “holding-out” explanation.93 The
former—now ascendant—holds that common carriers were bound to serve
all-comers only because they enjoyed a monopoly; as such, no such duty
need accrue to businesses operating in a market where there are
competitors.94 The latter explanation—now forgotten, Singer writes—
grounds universal access in a moral duty: one who “put[s] out [a] sign” or
holds himself out to the public as a business open for customers is bound to
accept everyone; to do otherwise would be to succumb to “prejudices []

90
See, e.g., Frederick Engels, The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,
MARXISTS (May–June 1876), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-played-labour/
(“What cared the Spanish planters in Cuba, who burned down forests on the slopes of the mountains and
obtained from the ashes sufficient fertilizer for one generation of very highly profitable coffee trees –
what cared they that the heavy tropical rainfall afterwards washed away the unprotected upper stratum
of the soil, leaving behind only bare rock!”).
91
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS
(2012) (highlighting various examples of societal harm arising through commodification).
92
A related point has been raised in defense of Catholic Social Services’ conscience claims in
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. For example, James Campbell argues that Philadelphia is disserving needy
children “by eliminating agencies that operate consistently with traditional Catholic (and similar
religious) beliefs about marriage, thereby reducing foster-care resources in the midst of an existing
shortage.” James Campbell, Symposium: Philadelphia’s Exclusion of Faith-Based Foster Agency
Departs from History and Undermines Interests of Children, SCOTUSBLOG, (Oct. 29, 2020, 11:16 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-philadelphias-exclusion-of-faith-based-fosteragency-departs-from-history-and-undermines-interests-of-children/.
93
Singer, No Right, supra note 6, at 1401–08.
94
Singer, Sodom, supra note 39, at 938–39.
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unworthy of our better manhood.”95 Singer explains further that the
monopoly rationale has a dubious origin, propelled as it was by Lochnerian
economic liberty and Jim Crow racism. And it is morally dubious to boot
because it locates the wrong of discrimination in the inconvenience it
imposes rather than the dignitary harm of being treated as if one is a member
of a lower caste.96
In place of the libertarian picture, under which businesses have
unfettered rights to refuse service in a competitive marketplace,97 Singer
urges a return to the holding-out picture. In this picture, store owners cannot,
for any reason, refuse anyone willing to accept the commercial offer the
store extends. This picture ensures not only that members of protected
classes will be guaranteed service but so too anyone with the means and
willingness to pay for the store’s goods and services.98 But notice the
implication of this absolutist view: Singer’s picture would require a reception
hall owner to rent her space to the NAACP and KKK alike. By contrast, the
owner could decline the KKK rental but not the NAACP on the model of
business-with-conscience. Why might one then prefer Singer’s picture?
Singer offers an argument rooted in pre-legal moral commitments. He
writes, “civil rights laws do not limit property rights. They define what
property rights can exist in a free and democratic society. They establish the
structural baseline, the infrastructure of a society that is committed to granting
equal protection of the laws.”99 The holding-out picture would then make civil
rights laws conceptually and normatively prior to property rights, whereas the
business-with-conscience model is compatible with viewing state public
accommodations laws as super-imposed upon existing property entitlements.
There is undoubtedly something appealing in Singer’s genealogy: it
allows us to say to the person who insists that anti-discrimination laws
violate her property rights that her property rights never included the right
to discriminate in the first instance. But that rhetorical advantage has to be
95
Singer, No Right, supra note 6, at 1410. The holding-out notion is not completely absent from
recent doctrine. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (“Most important,
the shopping center by choice of its owner is not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is instead a
business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please.”).
96
Singer, Sodom, supra note 39, at 938 (“The idea that one can ‘just go elsewhere’ misses the point
entirely. The question is not whether one can find a store willing to let you in and treat you with dignity.
The question is whether one has a right to enter stores without worrying about such things.”). See also
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Discrimination
is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and
embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the
public . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why
Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1290 (2014) (arguing that
business owners should be permitted to discriminate so long as would-be customers can be served elsewhere).
98
Some states take this absolutist stance when it comes to housing too, forbidding refusals on
conscience-based grounds to anyone. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 874 P.2d
274, 279–80 (Alaska 1994) (holding that the Free Exercise clause does not permit landlord to refuse to
rent to unmarried couples in violation of antidiscrimination statute).
99
Singer, Sodom, supra note 39, at 947–48 (footnote omitted).
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balanced against the practical upshot of conceiving of business property as
a belated development, beholden to Singer’s structural baseline. And the
most egalitarian understanding of that baseline would prohibit every refusal
of service.
I think this goes too far. Compelled universal access recruits store
owners into supporting projects they—oftentimes rightly—have reason to
oppose (such as the legally authorized but morally troubling marriages of
underage girls).100 And it deprives individuals of meaningful work lives.
Work can already be alienating, in any number of ways, even if one is
self-employed. Even the most enriching of jobs can come with its fair share
of grunt work and tedium. Business realities might compel the person who
owns her own store or restaurant to put up with conduct that she would not
otherwise tolerate (e.g., from berating customers, leering suppliers,
hot-tempered talent in the kitchen, and so on). Why shouldn’t she want to
deny her blood, sweat, and tears to individuals or endeavors she has reason
to oppose? To be sure, many individuals lack the kind of workplace
autonomy that would allow them to choose their clientele. This is surely a
problem in its own right.101 But for those who do enjoy such autonomy, it
seems desirable to allow them to exercise it.
In Part III, I advance a new understanding of public accommodations
laws that would allow businesses to refuse service to people who seek a
store’s wares for projects promoting hate, even if those projects are
connected to the putative customer’s protected characteristics (e.g., a
member of the Christian KKK church wants to rent a reception hall for his
church’s banquet). But first we must see why the Equal Access policy, like
Singer’s holding-out account, sweeps too broadly and, worse still, fails to
offer robust protection to the very minorities it is designed to serve.
II. THE UNEQUAL ASPECTS OF EQUAL ACCESS
Equal Access holds that a public accommodation may not provide a
good or service to one person that it would deny to another. That principle
received explicit endorsement in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.102 And indeed
the role it played there belies the widely accepted view that Masterpiece was

100

See infra notes 153 and 183–86 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND PRIVATE
GOVERNMENT 94, 95–96 (2015) (describing how the modern workplace functions like a dictatorship).
102
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). See supra note 21 (citing the opinions of Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and
Ginsburg, each of whom adhered to a version of this principle).
101
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a non-decision103—narrow and sui generis, or even a “punt.”104 To be sure,
the Court did not rule on the central question in the case—namely, whether
a vendor may refuse, on free exercise or free speech grounds, to provide a
custom-made product, especially one that has words or artistry. Instead, the
Court found that the Colorado proceedings were infected by prejudice and
so vacated the decisions below.105 But in finding that Colorado had acted
with “hostility to religion,”106 the Court relied heavily on Equal Access.107
So too has virtually every other court in justifying the requirement that a
place of public accommodation offer members of a protected class the very
same products or services that it offers to others.108 And yet, as this Part
argues, Equal Access is bound to lead us astray.
What then explains its grip? Equal Access would be a passable rule of
thumb if one wanted to identify, say, the distinctive wrong of the lunch
counter owner who refused to serve Black people in the Jim Crow South.
The lunch counter has a set menu; in offering the menu items to white people
but not Black people, the owner impermissibly discriminated on the basis of
a protected characteristic. So, contrary to Equal Access, the owner denied
one party the qualitatively same good it could readily have had available and
willingly provided to another. Even there, however, one might want
something that more richly conceptualized the nature of the exclusion—
capturing the fact that the basis of the exclusion was an immutable,
ascriptive characteristic; or, better still, one might point to the way in which
the exclusion reinforced the subordination of an already oppressed group.109
After all, refusing to serve all Black people has a unique significance and
103
See, e.g., Christine Emba, The Supreme Court Wasn’t Ready to Decide on the Wedding Cake.
Neither Are We., WASH. POST (June 5, 2018, 7:34 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thesupreme-court-wasnt-ready-to-decide-on-the-wedding-cake-neither-are-we/2018/06/05/55c890f86905-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.0bc495192b55 (calling the decision “halfbaked”).
104
Mark Joseph Stern, Gay Americans Have Little to Fear from the Supreme Court’s Compromise
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, SLATE (June 4, 2018, 11:54 AM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/06/the-supreme-courts-decision-in-masterpiece-cakeshop-is-a-kennedy-compromise.html.
105
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1727.
108
For example, in Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), the New Mexico
Supreme Court illustrated the principle enshrined in its Human Rights Act (NMHRA) as follows: “If a
restaurant offers a full menu to male customers, it may not refuse to serve entrees to women, even if it
will serve them appetizers. The NMHRA does not permit businesses to offer a ‘limited menu’ of goods
or services to customers on the basis of a status that fits within one of the protected categories.” Willock,
309 P.3d at 62. See also Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 428–29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (quoting
the Elane language just cited as support); Klein v. Or. Bureau of Lab. & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051, 1061
(Or. Ct. App. 2017) (describing the nature of the discrimination in this way: “Sweetcakes provides a
service—making wedding cakes—to heterosexual couples who intend to wed, but it denies the service
to same-sex couples who likewise intend to wed.”). But see Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix,
448 P.3d 890, 926 (Ariz. 2019) (holding that custom invitations were pure speech and public
accommodations ordinance requiring service would then constitute compelled speech in violation of the
First Amendment).
109
See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 123–
24 (1976).
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sting—different, for example, from a refusal to serve, say, the father of the
bully who had recently bested the lunch counter owner’s son in an
unsportsmanlike contest. But still, as a first cut, Equal Access tracks at least
a part of the wrong of anti-Black policies. It captures the intuitive idea that
we ought to treat likes alike.110
Where Equal Access works, it works because the would-be customers
will make the same use of the products or services on offer. The two
individuals who seek to be served at the lunch counter typically want the
same experience or endpoint—the consumption of a meal. There is no
difference in their purpose, and, as I have argued, a difference in purpose in
fact grounds an important distinction in what a putative customer asks of a
vendor. Think again of renting one’s hall for a KKK rally relative to an
NAACP event.
Further, it is not just that Equal Access is over-inclusive, forbidding
refusals of service that the law ought to allow; it is also under-inclusive,
permitting discrimination against some individuals who should be protected.
Moreover, in other cases still, the principle fails to yield determinate results,
since the question of whether two objects are the “same” is one the principle
does not illuminate. Finally, the principle rests on a logical fallacy. I elaborate
on each of these in turn, beginning with the principle’s logical flaws.
A. Equal Access Rests on a Logical Fallacy
The Equal Access principle is meant to distinguish between permissible
and impermissible refusals of service, especially when it comes to the
vendor’s inventory or repertoire. A vendor offends against no one, the
thought goes, if he refuses to provide a good or service that he does not take
to be a part of what he is in the market to sell. So, a cake baker who refuses
a customer’s order for brisket, or a massage therapist who refuses a patron’s
request for a haircut, does not impermissibly discriminate, even if the person
making the request is a member of a protected class. Neither the baker nor
the massage therapist has held themselves out as purveyors of the requested

110
Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
19 (1959) (“A principled decision . . . is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case,
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.”). Of
course, Weschler had an overly rigid conception of “generality,” which abstracted from considerations
that in fact relevantly distinguished the cases he critiqued, as Louis Pollak convincingly showed. Louis
H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 32–34 (1959). The critique of the neutral principle doctrine offered here is a specific version of
Pollak’s larger complaint—principled decisions should be attuned to the particulars, especially
particulars having to do with race or other dynamics sustaining inequality.
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good or service. As it is often put, the vendor in question “would not sell the
requested [product or service] to anyone.”111
That principle proved decisive in distinguishing between the Colorado
cake baker in Masterpiece who, for religious reasons, refused to provide a
cake for a same-sex wedding, and a second Colorado cake baker who, for
secular moral reasons, refused to provide a cake with religious anti-gay
messages. The second case was brought by William Jack, a fundamentalist
Christian, who requested two cakes from Azucar bakery—one with an image
of an X-ed out gay couple and the other with a biblical verse decrying
homosexuality.112 When the owner of Azucar, Marjorie Silva, refused to
provide either cake, Jack filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission. Applying its Equal Access principle, the Commission held that
Azucar did not violate Colorado’s public accommodations law in refusing
because Silva would not have supplied anti-gay cakes to anyone; her refusal
was predicated on the nature of the cake that was sought, not the identity of
the customer seeking it.113 In this way, Silva was like the baker who refuses
to provide a Jewish customer with a brisket—not because that baker does
not serve Jews but because that baker does not serve briskets. Justice Kagan
affirmed the distinction between Phillips and Jack on the ground that “[a]
vendor can choose the products he sells but not the customers he serves.”114
While that principle seems compelling on its face, it actually turns on a
logical fallacy, which we can see if we break it down:
Principle 1: If a vendor, V, does not sell briskets to anyone,
then V does not offend against a particular customer C when
V refuses to sell a brisket to C.
Principle 2: If V does sell briskets to some customers then
he offends against C when V refuses to sell a brisket to C.115
111
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1733 n.*, 1735 (2018)
(Kagan, J., concurring).
112
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae William Jack and the National Center for Law and Policy in
Support of Petitioners at 5, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-1111), http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/16-111_tsac_william_jack_et_al.pdf. Jack is not the only one aiming to turn
the tables on bakers who support equal rights for members of the LGBTQ community. In a bid to expose
hypocrisy, some in the “anti-gay community” are ordering “‘Gay Marriage Is Wrong’ cakes from gayfriendly bakeries.” Isabelle Chapman, Colorado Bakery Facing Legal Action After Refusing to Make
Anti-Gay Cake, AOL (Jan. 20, 2015, 1:04 PM), https://www.aol.com/article/2015/01/20/coloradobakery-facing-legal-action-after-refusing-to-make-anti/21132364/.
113
See, e.g., John Corvino, Drawing a Line in the ‘Gay Wedding Cake’ Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/27/opinion/gay-wedding-cake.html (discussing the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s ruling).
114
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring).
115
Formally, Principle 2 is the inverse of Principle 1. But one cannot validly infer the inverse of a
principle from the original; one can only validly infer the contrapositive. All of this should be familiar
from LSAT studying (though apparently lost on established jurists). See, e.g., Conditional Reasoning
and Logical Equivalence, KHAN ACAD., https://www.khanacademy.org/test-prep/lsat/lsat-lessons/logictoolbox-new/a/logic-toolbox--article--conditional-reasoning-logical-equivalence (last visited Aug. 6,
2020).
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Principle 2 is effectively a version of Equal Access. The problem is that
Principle 2 is supposed to derive from Principle 1, when in fact Principle 1
does not logically compel Principle 2. Compare: if there are no eggs in the
house, you cannot make a meringue. If there are eggs in the house, then you
can make a meringue. Or: if the car has no gas, it cannot be driven. If the car
has gas, it can be driven. Or again: if you do not have a date for the prom,
you will feel awkward attending. If you have a date for the prom, then you
will not feel awkward attending. In all of these cases, the first proposition
has an antecedent that states a necessary condition for the consequent—
meringues require eggs; cars require gas; non-awkward proms (let’s
imagine) require dates. But necessary conditions are oftentimes not
sufficient—meringues also require sugar; cars need inflated tires and
working parts; proms require winning personalities, decent dance skills, and
smooth repartee if they are not to feel awkward (for some of us anyway). By
the same token, getting one’s hands on a brisket requires a purveyor of
briskets. But that is not all: a customer may purchase a brisket from its
purveyor only if she has the money to pay, she is wearing shoes, she is not
smoking in the store, etc. The problem, generally stated, is this: in each of
the foregoing cases, the second principle is the inverse of the first and it is a
central tenet of propositional logic that you cannot establish the truth of a
conditional proposition simply by inverting another conditional proposition
you know to be true. But that is just how courts and commentators proceed
in deriving Equal Access. Again, they hold that vendors may decline to sell
someone a good that they would not sell to anyone else; but once a vendor
does sell that good to someone, he must sell it to everyone else. That
progression of thought presupposes that the only reason to turn someone
away is because one does not sell the product they are requesting to anyone.
But that is not a claim that courts or commentators can presuppose; instead,
it is precisely the claim that stands in need of argument. Of course, there
could be compelling reasons not to refuse any customer a good or service
that is the same as one the seller has sold or would sell to someone else. But
what then counts as the “same”?
B. Problems with Treating Two Goods As “Alike”
Equal Access prohibits denying one customer a good or service that is
the same as a good or service the vendor offers another customer. Applying
this principle immediately thrusts one into a tangled web of problems around
discerning when two products count as the “same.” One can readily see that
goods or services might come in endless varieties and which of these are
sufficiently similar to those the vendor holds himself out as providing and
which are not already raises difficult issues. For example, if a baker offers
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cakes decorated in all of the shades of the rainbow must he then agree to
create a rainbow cake?
But now let us suppose that a customer wants a product that common
sense tells us is the same product as one the vendor has sold in the past—it
is identical in appearance and composition to that other product and, were
the two to have sat on the store’s shelf at the same time, a customer would
have had no reason to prefer one to the other. There might nonetheless be a
meaningful difference between them. Consider, for example, two cakes,
identical in all respects, each bearing the words “Yay, KKK!” Do the two
satisfy the same-product requirement of Equal Access if the first cake is for
a celebration of the three Kardashian sisters and the second a celebration of
the Ku Klux Klan? Here, even though the words are the same, the referent
of “KKK” is different. Why shouldn’t they count as different such that
denying the Christian KKK customer his cake does not run afoul of Equal
Access? Nor could we be assured that two cakes were the same even if they
were identical in appearance and the intended meaning of whatever words
they bore was the same too. A baker has reason to care that his
“Congratulations!” cake will be served at the KKK banquet rather than some
more benign event. Insofar as Equal Access cannot recognize that sometimes
the event at which a product will be served (or used) informs the nature of
the product that it is (i.e., whether it is the same as some identical-looking
product), Equal Access sweeps too broadly.
But so too is Equal Access underinclusive, permitting refusals of service
that it should forbid. For once we allow a vendor unilateral authority to
control just what products he offers, there is no reason why he might not
forego product lines precisely in order to discriminate against protected
individuals. Take, for example, a baker who harbors gay animus and so
decides that he will not make rainbow cakes for anyone. Equal Access would
have to countenance the baker’s decision. But that would be to miss the fact
that there is an expressive slight in denying a gay customer a rainbow cake
that is absent when the baker denies a rainbow cake for, say, an
eight-year-old’s birthday party. Put differently, surely the appropriate way
to judge this baker’s refusal is not to compare what he would or would not
be willing to serve to other customers; it is just to ask whether he has turned
someone away on the basis of a protected status.116
Indeed, Equal Access contains the seeds of its undoing precisely because
it focuses on treating likes alike. In that way, it builds in a loophole for any
vendor who can make the case that his wares are customizable—or, more
compelling still, unique creations. For these vendors, it will never be the case
that one product is the same as any other. And, since Equal Access requires
only that the vendor not refuse a product to someone when the vendor has
116
On the relationship between status and conduct, see Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661, 696 (2010).
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offered the same product to others in the past, the vendor who never offers
the same product twice necessarily never violates Equal Access.
The point holds as well in that part of the “marketplace” where patrons
procure public services.117 Take the now-pending case of Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, where Catholic Social Services (CSS) is challenging
Philadelphia’s refusal to have CSS serve as a foster placement agency
because CSS will not place children with same-sex couples. CSS’s position
would seem to be a straightforward case of invidious discrimination, but it
is not one that Equal Access can recognize: Under Equal Access, CSS could
be found to have discriminated only if it declined to place a child with a
same-sex couple where it had, or would have, placed a similar child with a
relevantly similar opposite-sex couple.118 But if a custom-made cake
qualifies as unique, a fortiori a given child or couple or family or living
situation is unique too119 (even the happy ones, with no disrespect to
Tolstoy).120 More generally, given any fact-intensive function or
personalized service, the details of that function or service will necessarily
be tailored to the party being served. As such, there will never be a relevant
precedent with which to compare a challenged refusal of service in order to
know if the present party has been the target of discrimination.
Note finally that Equal Access gets the inquiry about what goods a
vendor must provide backwards. In deciding whether a vendor can supply
the requested product a patron requests, the vendor does not ask himself, “Is
the requested product (or service) the same as (or even relevantly similar to)
products I have provided to others in the past?” Instead, he contemplates the
meaning for him of the requested product on its own terms. The question is,
“Can I provide the requested product in good conscience?” If he determines
that he can, then—but only then—will he conclude that the requested
product is relevantly similar to others he has offered in the past. In this way,
sameness or similarity is epiphenomenal. It is the outcome of an inquiry
about the moral meaning of a good or service, not a consideration that
informs that outcome. Two goods or services are relevantly similar insofar
as neither provokes a conscientious objection. But in determining whether a

117
See Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Scholars in Support of Equality in Support of Respondents at
27, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19–123 (Aug. 18, 2020) (suggesting that foster agencies operate
in the “marketplace.”).
118
See supra note 22.
119
Thus, a federal district court approvingly quoted foster guidance stating that “‘[a] holistic
assessment is essential to achieve the intent of each section and make final recommendations regarding
placement and permanency for children. All families are unique; these questions are not one size fits
all.’” Blais v. Hunter, No. 2:20-cv-00187-SMJ, 2020 WL 5960687, at *9 (E.D. Wa. Oct. 18, 2020),
available at https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.waed.90879/gov.uscourts.waed.90879.5
6.0.pdf. See also id. at *12.
120
LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA, Ch. 1 (Constance Garrett, trans., 1998) (1878) (ebook)
(“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”)
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good or service provokes a conscientious objection, the vendor need not
appeal to past practice at all.
In sum, Equal Access’s focus on comparing a requested product or
service to those the vendor has offered, or would offer, is wrong-headed for
many reasons. At bottom, it does not track what we, and the law, should care
about. What matters is not that the vendor proceed consistently (assuming,
contrary to what we have seen, that we can come up with a coherent,
principled conception of what counts as being consistent); what matters is
whether he is treating his patrons with the respect they deserve, no matter
how the vendor dealt with others in the past. Equal Access does not provide
an evaluation on that basis.
III. THE MARKET AS A HATE-FREE ZONE
How then should we conceptualize impermissible discrimination in the
marketplace, especially once we recognize, as I have urged,121 that
conscience has a legitimate role to play therein? I divide the analysis here
between the provision of commercial goods and services, on the one hand,
and public services, on the other. Thus, in Section III.A, I argue that
anti-discrimination laws should in general trump conscience in the retail
sphere. In Section III.B, I argue that the prohibition against discrimination
is even stronger in the case of public service provision.
But I do not adopt the Equal Access, or “holding-out,” policy critiqued
above.122 Instead, in Section III.C, I defend refusals of service for products
or services that would be used in projects involving hate. Paradigmatic here
would be a refusal to supply goods or services for a KKK event, whether the
KKK group is affiliated with a religious or secular supremacist group. I
argue that we should see refusals that respond to the hateful projects of
putative customers not as deviations from the egalitarian ethos of Equal
Access but instead as continuous with and supportive of that ethos. In
Section III.D, I consider the implications of this more nuanced policy of
refusing service for public service providers.
A. No Exemptions from Serving Protected Classes in Commerce
To begin, it is worth noting that every exemption is an accommodation
that recruits the community in promoting the personal commitments of the
exempted party.123 Exemptions release the exempted party from one of his
political obligations. The rest of us must continue to obey the law, even if

121

See supra Part I.
See supra Section I.B.2.
123
See SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY AND THE LAW 158
(2014) (defining accommodations as “social practice[s] in which we absorb some of the costs of others’
free and morally relevant choices in order to acknowledge, create room for, lift barriers to, facilitate, or
convey a message about their choices”).
122
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many of us might prefer not to.124 Further, the exemption may impose
material costs on others. Given the potential third-party costs of an
exemption, the typical case—seeking, for example, to be released from the
draft, or Sunday Sabbath laws, or compulsory education—should then
involve a balancing test, weighing (1) the objector’s burden of complying
with the challenged legal requirement against (2) the strength of the
obligation to obey laws of that kind and also the costs that an exemption
would inflict on discrete third parties.125 But where the conscientious
objector seeks an exemption from an anti-discrimination law, balancing has
no place; the state should categorically refuse.
This is because the logic of anti-discrimination protections cannot
sustain exceptions. Again, these protections convey that, in the public
sphere, discrimination is categorically wrong. The Court in Hobby Lobby
recognized as much when it said that “prohibitions on racial discrimination”
(which can be evaded only under strict scrutiny) “are precisely tailored to
achieve th[e] critical goal [of eradicating racism].”126 In other words, the
state cannot have a society wherein there is no racism if it sometimes permits
racism.127 The same holds true for discrimination against members of other
protected groups.
Still, an exemption supporter might concede the importance of equality
but then point out that equality can be cashed out in different ways. A regime
in which everyone is entitled to turn others away on the basis of genuine and
deeply held conscientious convictions enshrines a version of equality too:
each of us is equally empowered to exercise their conscience as they see fit,
which means, in particular, that each of us is equally empowered to decide,
on the basis of conscience, whom they will or will not serve.128 Indeed, much
124
See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (1994) (noting
that those with political or other non-religious commitments are not provided the same “governmental
arrangements” as those with religious commitments).
125
This is a gloss on Sepinwall, supra note 57, at 1966–79. For other work urging more serious
attention to third parties, see Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting “Third
Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433, 470–74 (2014).
126
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 733 (2014).
127
In State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., a case where a florist had denied her services for a same-sex
wedding, the Washington Supreme Court offered a definitive statement of this principle, noting that other
courts had done the same:

[t]his case is no more about access to flowers than civil rights cases in the 1960s were
about access to sandwiches. As every other court to address the question has
concluded, public accommodations laws do not simply guarantee access to goods or
services. Instead, they serve a broader societal purpose: eradicating barriers to the
equal treatment of all citizens in the commercial marketplace. Were we to carve out a
patchwork of exceptions for ostensibly justified discrimination, that purpose would
be fatally undermined.
441 P.3d 1203, 1235 (Wash. 2019) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (internal
quotations omitted).
128
See David Velleman, Comment, Same-Sex Weddings (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3) (draft on
file with author).
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current public accommodations law already operates in just this way, as we
have seen.129
I believe that there are at least four reasons to reject a regime that would
allow every business carte blanche to decide, on conscientious grounds,
whom to serve and whom to turn away. First, such a regime would court
balkanization. Our world would devolve into a series of segregated enclaves,
where each of us interacts only with others who share our beliefs, or our
lifestyles, or our family values, or our race, religion, ethnicity, and so on.
There is perhaps something comfortable about that world but there is also
something troubling about it: for one thing, it prompts us to reduce people
to the traits we do not like about them. The relevant fact about Charlie
Craig—the customer turned away in Masterpiece—is his sexual orientation,
not his job, his hobbies, or the fact that he brought his mother to the bakery
to help him select a wedding cake. By contrast, compelled service might
weaken some of the existing divisions. Thus, interacting with Craig, rather
than turning him away, might have allowed Phillips, the baker, to see Craig
more fully, in ways that would humanize him in Phillips’s eyes (and vice
versa for the salutary effects that interacting with Phillips might have had
for Craig).
Second, we should recognize that a refusal of service has a different
meaning than a government requirement to serve. For example, a wedding
vendor’s refusal can legitimately be read as an expression of contempt—
and, for the reasons above, contempt not just for the same-sex couple’s
choice to marry but for who they fundamentally are (marriage being central
to a reasonable conception of the good life).130 On the other hand, if the
129

See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (noting the “centrality of marriage to
the human condition” and stating that “marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations”).
Many of the state court wedding vendor decisions insist on denying a difference between refusing service
for a same-sex wedding and refusing service on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e.g., Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013) (“[W]hen a law prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, that law similarly protects conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual
orientation.”). The position is consistent with the U.S. constitutional law doctrine rejecting distinctions
between a protected status and conduct closely correlated with that status. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 695 (2010); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“When
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination . . . .”). Cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (“A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.”). Interestingly,
Britain’s Supreme Court has come out the other way, upholding the right of a baker to refuse to make a
cake with a pro-same-sex marriage message, and insisting that “[a]lthough the person who requested the
cake was gay, . . . the bakery owners’ refusal was based not on his sexual orientation, but on their
Protestant faith’s opposition to gay marriage.” Ed O’Loughlin, Belfast Bakery Was Free to Refuse Baking
Gay-Marriage Cake, Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2018, at A4.
Sensitive to the sting of being turned away, Douglas Laycock has proposed “a requirement that
merchants that refuse to serve same-sex couples announce that fact on their website or, for businesses
with only a local service area, on a sign outside their premises.” Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAMESEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 198–99 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony
R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008). To the extent that the proposal would normalize
opposition to same-sex marriage (which, for many, is tantamount to opposition to same-sex individuals),
it is hard to see how the proposal would not wage a dignitary harm at least as severe.
130
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government compels the vendor to provide service, the government does
convey that it privileges equality over religious freedom. But I suspect that
the expressive sting is less acute.131 For one thing, there is something
especially confronting about having another person tell you, to your face,
that you are not the kind of person he will serve.132 For another, the vendor
can broadcast his opposition to same-sex marriage in other ways.
Third, compelled service is dialogue-enhancing, whereas refusing
service is not. If the vendor has a right to immediately eject those whom
conscience will not permit him to serve, conversation will be foreclosed. But
if the law instead compels the vendor to provide service, then there is at least
in principle an opportunity for dialog to ensue. For example, if the baker in
Masterpiece had been compelled by law to serve the gay couple, he could
nonetheless have sought to have the couple release him from his legal
obligation by explaining his objection.133 By the same token, the couple
could perhaps have presented their relationship in ways that would have
made it comfortable for the baker, and perhaps even worthy of his support.134
We might see these in-store dialogs as the modern equivalent of the
discursive exchanges of the town square of yore, where conversation and
commerce flowed together, smoothing over difference.135
Finally, and most significantly, a regime permitting conscientious
exemptions risks creating minority oppression. It would be one thing if the
conscientious commitments in question were idiosyncratic and distributed
randomly across the population. For example, the bar on that corner will not
131
But see Laycock, supra note 130, at 198 (“In my view, the right to one’s own moral integrity
should generally trump the inconvenience of having to get the same service from another provider nearby.
Requiring a merchant to perform services that violate his deeply held moral commitments is far more
serious, different in kind and not just in degree, from mere inconvenience.”).
132
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (stating that public
accommodations laws “vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of
equal access to public establishments”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 179 (1976) (stating that antidiscrimination laws “guarantee that ‘a dollar in the hands of a Negro
will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man’”); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 138–41 (2014).
133
Addressing the wedding vendor cases specifically, Andrew Koppelman has defended
conscientious exemptions for wedding vendors who oppose same-sex marriage on the ground that the
LGBTQ community should be “magnanimous in victory.” Koppelman, supra note 74, at 628. But it is
one thing for a person to exercise magnanimity of their own accord and quite another for the law
effectively to impose it, by formally exempting vendors from their obligations under public
accommodations laws.
134
Cf. Support for Same-Sex Marriage Grows, Even Among Groups That Had Been Skeptical, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (June 26, 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/06/26/support-for-same-sex-marriagegrows-even-among-groups-that-had-been-skeptical/ (reporting on a 2017 survey finding changing
attitudes in favor of gay marriage among members of the same demographic group—for example, “47%
of white evangelical Millennials and Gen Xers—age cohorts born after 1964—favor same-sex marriage,
up from 29% in March 2016”).
135
See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT
ESSAYS 139 (1986) (presenting the idea of “doux commerce,” which posits that increases in market
activity promote a peaceful society and better manners). Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. V. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 90 (1980) (“[S]hopping center owners . . . open[] their centers to the public at large, effectively
replacing the State with respect to such traditional First Amendment forums as streets, sidewalks, and
parks.”) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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serve Eagles fans; the bar on this corner will not serve lawyers; and that bar
over there will not serve individuals with curly hair. Many people would
then face occasional denials of service, but these would feel arbitrary and so
not stigmatizing. But, if we allow people to deny service to members of
protected classes, we can expect that many will, and the aggregate effect will
be to create or reinforce stigma.136 Indeed, it is just to prevent this outcome
that we have protected classes.137
For all these reasons—the last especially—we should reject a policy
under which business owners can turn anyone away so long as they do so on
the basis of sincere conscientious convictions.
B. No Exemptions for Public Service Providers
If the state may interfere with private commercial entities in order to
prohibit discrimination, one would have thought that, a fortiori, it may
impose the anti-discrimination regulations to which it is bound on the
agencies with whom it contracts to carry out its functions.138 But there is
reason to think that a majority of Justices will find otherwise,139 and even
progressives may be without the resources to impose a categorical ban on
conscientious refusals.140
As discussed above, the Supreme Court is poised to decide Fulton v.
Philadelphia, in which Catholic Social Services challenges the city’s refusal
to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care. The city insists that its
foster agencies abide by its anti-discrimination law, which prohibits

136
See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018)
(noting that widespread exemptions would result “in a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the
history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services,
and public accommodations”); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at, 215 n.64, 224 (2018) (citations
omitted); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 30–31 (1996).
137
The legislative history of Title II of the Civil Rights Act suggests this view. “[N]o action is more
contrary to the spirit of our democracy and Constitution—or more rightfully resented by a Negro citizen
who seeks only equal treatment—than the barring of that citizen from . . . public accommodations and
facilities.” 109 CONG. REC. 11158 (1963). See also Jonathan Gingerich, Remixing Rawls: Constitutional
Cultural Liberties in Liberal Democracies, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 401, 457 (2019) (“In almost all
jurisdictions . . . businesses can arbitrarily exclude members of the public, refusing to . . . sell them goods
or services, provided that the exclusion is not based on one of several grounds specifically proscribed in
a public accommodation statute (such as race, gender, age, sexual orientation, marital status, and
employment by the military).”).
138
See, e.g., Kindall, supra note 46 (“The First Amendment does not require governments to use
private contractors who refuse to provide the contracted services on a nondiscriminatory basis.”). For an
interesting history of how social workers and others administering foster care violated state regulations,
as a matter of conscientious conviction, in order to place foster children with LGBTQ+ parents at a time
when the rules officially disqualified them, see Marie-Amélie George, Agency Nullification: Defying
Bans on Gay and Lesbian Foster and Adoptive Parents, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363 (2016).
139
See, e.g., Natalie Hope McDonald, With Fulton v. Philadelphia, U.S. Supreme Court is Poised
to Decide a New LGBT Rights Issue, PHILLY VOICE (Nov. 14, 2020), https://www.phillyvoice.com/ussupreme-court-fulton-vs-philadephia-lgbt-right-catholic-social-services-discrimination/ (noting that
there are now six conservative Justices on the Court and they seem to be leaning in favor of CSS).
140
See infra text accompanying notes 144–50.
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and CSS will not certify
same-sex couples as a matter of its religious convictions.
The most compelling reason CSS has for contesting the city’s refusal to
contract alleges that the refusal involves an unconstitutional condition: the
city requires CSS either to abandon (or speak against) its religious beliefs,
as a condition of providing foster care.141 Respondents142 and their progressive
supporters143 deny that there is an unconstitutional condition here. But the
Respondents’ position sits uncomfortably alongside the position progressives
have taken in a different set of cases—this one involving challenges to state
laws that would deny government contracts to entities that support the
Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) movement against Israel.144 In the latter
set of cases, progressives have argued that the state imposes an
unconstitutional condition when it requires that entities contracting with the
state forswear support for the BDS movement.145 On its face, there appears
141
See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 34, Fulton, No. 19–123 (“The City’s actions here
place unconstitutional conditions on CSS’s first amendment activities: the City is threatening to deny
CSS the ability to provide foster care to Philadelphia children unless CSS does and says things it believes
it should not.”).
A second reason CSS contests the city’s seeking to bind it to the city’s anti-discrimination law
seems to relate to the history of foster care in Philadelphia. CSS worked as a foster agency long before
the city adopted the mandate of administering all foster care work. See Brief for Petitioners at *3–6,
Fulton, No. 19–123. So CSS seems to see itself not as an agent of the city but instead as continuing on
in the private work it has long been doing, while helping the city fulfill the city’s mandate. See id.;
Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Fulton, No. 19–123. But the relevance of its history is subject to
question on two grounds. First, as Justice Kagan intimated at oral argument, it is not as if CSS would
abandon its insistence that it had a Free Exercise right to discriminate against same-sex couples if CSS
had only begun to serve foster children after Philadelphia took charge of foster care. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 23–24 (showing Justice Kagan questioning lawyer for CSS on this point). Second, CSS
seems to operate with a misconception about what its history should entail. With the expansion of state
power over the twentieth century, government has extended itself into lots of realms previously the
province of private entities. But that does not mean that the government must allow these private entities
to operate according to their own rules. Cf. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 885 (1990) (entitling religious objectors to exemptions from generally applicable rules would make
every person “a law unto himself,” impairing the ability of government to carry out its functions) (quoting
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)). To the contrary, once the government
legitimately claims a domain as its own, it is empowered to supplant the private agencies’ rules with its
own, so long as it subjects all of them to the same rules. So while CSS may have a venerable history of
foster care—it almost surely warrants great praise for undertaking this important work before the state
recognized its responsibility to do so—it cannot leverage that history to act in ways that the government
has good reason to prohibit.
142
See Brief for City Respondents at 19, (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 632 (1943) for the proposition that “persons who ‘voluntarily enroll’ in a government program ‘may
not on ground of conscience refuse [its] conditions’”).
143
See, e.g., Kindall, supra note 46; William M. Pinzler, ‘Fulton v. Philadelphia’: A Conflict
Between Anti-Discrimination Laws and the Free Exercise Clause, LAW.COM (Nov. 03, 2020, 01:00 PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/11/03/fulton-v-philadelphia-a-conflict-between-antidiscrimination-laws-and-the-free-exercise-clause/?slreturn=20201108080354 (“CSS is free to express
itself outside the foster care program, and thus it is arguably not an unconstitutional condition.”).
144
See, e.g., Amawi v. Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 717 (W.D. Tex. 2019); Jordahl
v. Brnovich, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (D. Ariz. 2019).
145
For commentary arguing that the challenged laws violate the First Amendment, see, for example,
Timothy Cuffman, Note, The State Power to Boycott a Boycott: The Thorny Constitutionality of State

2021]

CONSCIENCE IN COMMERCE

35

to be a tension between the two positions: Philadelphia may refuse to
contract with entities, like CSS, that discriminate, but Texas, Arizona, and others
may not refuse to contract with entities that support the BDS movement.
One might think that the two cases are distinguishable because there is
nothing discriminatory about the BDS movement (notwithstanding the fact
that some states have sought to defend their anti-BDS laws as efforts to
combat anti-Semitism).146 I am inclined to agree that the BDS movement
targets Israeli policies and not the Jewish people, so it is not anti-Semitic.
Still, it seems doubtful that all of those who challenge the anti-BDS laws
would abandon their challenges if it turned out that the BDS movement was
avowedly anti-Semitic. The ACLU, for example, which has led the
challenge against many of these state laws,147 sees the laws as impinging on
free speech, and we know that the ACLU’s robust protection for free speech
does not depend on the content of the speech at issue.148
If it is safe to assume that opposition to the anti-BDS laws would persist
even if these laws aimed at combatting anti-Semitic speech, then in both the
anti-BDS cases and Fulton, we would face a government decision not to
contract with entities that discriminate. And if it were permissible for the
government to act on this decision as regards CSS, why would it not also be
permissible for the government to act on this decision as regards the entities
challenging the anti-BDS laws? The answer, I believe, turns on the fact that
CSS would discriminate in the course of the activities it would carry out on
the government’s behalf, whereas the anti-BDS laws deny contracts to
entities no matter how close or remote the entities’ support for BDS is to
their government work. That is, CSS seeks to fulfill the government’s
functions in a discriminatory manner. The entities denied contracts under the
anti-BDS laws need only have “engaged in . . . a boycott of goods or services

Anti-BDS Laws, 57 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 115, 134–62 (2018); Recent Cases–Recent Legislation,
129 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2016) (discussing S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-5300 (2015)); Nathaniel Sobel,
Breaking Down the Combating BDS Act of 2019 and First Amendment Challenges to State Anti-BDS
Laws, LAWFARE (Mar. 19, 2019, 7:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/breaking-down-combatingbds-act-2019-and-first-amendment-challenges-state-anti-bds-laws (“[A] group of leading First
Amendment scholars [ ] argue that boycotting Israel qualifies as protected speech. ‘This is an easy First
Amendment case,’ they told the court.”); Noah Feldman, Is the Anti-BDS Bill Constitutional? Yes,
But …, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2019, 2:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-0206/anti-bds-bill-approved-by-senate-avoids-first-amendment-questions (There is . . . a powerful
constitutional argument to be made that the state [anti-BDS] laws violate free speech.”).
146
See, e.g., Note, Wielding Antidiscrimination Law to Suppress the Movement for Palestinian
Rights, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1360, 1365–66 (cataloging states that have marshaled this defense).
147
See Brian Hauss, Laws Suppressing Boycotts of Israel Don’t Prevent Discrimination — They
Violate Civil Liberties, ACLU (Feb. 22, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/lawssuppressing-boycotts-israel-dont-prevent-discrimination-they-violate-civil.
148
See Freedom of Expression - ACLU Position Paper, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/freedo
m-expression-aclu-position-paper (last visited Jan. 8, 2020).
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from Israel”;149 the laws do not require that the boycott relate to the services
the boycotter would perform for the state.150
To be sure, Philadelphia would violate CSS’s constitutional rights if it
prohibited CSS from speaking against same-sex marriage as a condition of
CSS’s contract with the city. So too would Philadelphia violate CSS’s right
if the contract instead required CSS to forswear activities promoting
traditional families in domains other than those that the contract governs
(e.g., if it required CSS to dispense condoms at its after-school programs
even though the after-school programs were run independent of the city).
But the contract does nothing like either of these things. Instead, it simply
requires that CSS abide by the same anti-discrimination principles that bind
the city, and only where and for the activities CSS undertakes on
Philadelphia’s behalf.
The important feature, then, is not which set of beliefs is at issue. It is
whether that set of beliefs will entail a refusal of service in the course of the
service agency’s work on the government’s behalf. States might well be
within their rights to insist that their contractors not boycott one or more
countries while carrying out the states’ functions. Philadelphia is surely
within its rights to insist that CSS not boycott LGBTQ+ individuals while
carrying out Philadelphia’s foster care work. More generally, where a
private entity steps into the government’s shoes, its license to discriminate
may be no broader than the government’s.
C. Hate Has No Home Here
If, as the last two Sections have sought to show, carte blanche
discrimination is a non-starter, does that leave no room for conscience in
commerce at all? This Section takes up the suggestion in Parts I and II that
we need not adopt a categorical Equal Access policy in order to secure the
ends of anti-discrimination laws, or egalitarianism more broadly construed.
It champions the business owner’s right to deny service where the denial is
not predicated on the would-be customer’s protected characteristics. In
particular, this Section aims to protect storeowners from having to do
business with those who promote hate or oppression, even when that hate or

149
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-393.01(1)(a) (West, Westlaw current through Second Reg. Sess. of
the Fifty-Fourth Leg.). Similar language can be found in other state statutes. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 332.065(5)(A) (2019); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2270.001 et seq. (West, Westlaw through the
end of the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Leg.)
150
Thus, for example, in one of the challenges, a speech pathologist was unable to renew her
contract with a public school district because she refused to sign a certification declaring that she would
not boycott Israel while the contract was in effect. She described her BDS participation in this way: She
chose to “buy[] Palestinian olive oil and refus[ed] to buy the Sabra brand of hummus because of the
company's connections to Israel.” Amawi v. Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 717, 731–32
(W.D. Tex. 2019). Clearly, these buying decisions have nothing to do with her speech pathology work.
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oppression is mandated by religion. In this way, the proposal aims to
vindicate both conscience and equality.
Recall the hypothetical around underage marriage.151 To flesh it out
further, imagine one Mrs. Lovett, of Mrs. Lovett’s Pies and Cakes, who is
approached by an elderly man and young woman and asked to bake a cake
for their upcoming nuptials. In conversation, it comes out that the man,
Judge Turpin, is an upstanding member of the community while Joanna, his
bride-to-be, is fifteen.152 When Judge Turpin leaves the room, Joanna
confesses that she has no romantic feelings for Turpin, but she is consigned
to go ahead with the marriage as her parents support it, she believes that they
know best, and, at any rate, their religion encourages girls to get married
before age sixteen to men who have already established themselves.153
Mrs. Lovett, appalled at the thought of underage marriage, tells the
couple that the law will permit no such thing and she cannot possibly furnish
a cake for an illegal marriage. But Mrs. Lovett is wrong, as Judge Turpin
informs her: in all but three states, underage children can be married off—
typically, so long as the couple can obtain the approval of a judge or the

151

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Those familiar with Thomas Peckett Prest’s Penny Dreadful novel, The String of Pearls (1846),
or its contemporary adaptation as Sweeney Todd, The Demon Barber of Fleet Street by Christopher
Godfrey Bond (1970) (play) and then Stephen Sondheim and Hugh Wheeler (under the pen name Patrick
Quentin) (1979) (musical), will recognize the characters’ names and the rough modification of the
storyline for purposes of the hypothetical. Perhaps most significantly, while Turpin is Joanna’s adopted
father in the story, I omit that detail here so as not to prejudice the case against underage marriage.
Readers may further assume that no human beings are harmed in the making of any of the pies or cakes
of the Mrs. Lovett who appears here.
153
See, e.g., Lucy Anna Gray, Lifting the Veil: Why Children Are Still Getting Married in America,
INDEPENDENT (Apr. 16, 2020, 8:45 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/childmarriage-us-states-america-minimum-age-bride-girls-a9467121.html (reporting that close to 14,0000
children marry in the U.S. each year, some as young as twelve years old; 87% of them are girls and 86%
of those girls marry adults—with as many as sixty years separating husband and wife); Carol Kuruvilla,
In Some Evangelical Circles, Grown Men Pursuing Teens Isn’t All That Unusual, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 14, 2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/roy-moore-evangelicalism_us_5a05f
4f8e4b0e37d2f37573d (“[Y]oung marriage is encouraged in some Christian communities because
marrying young reduces the chance of people having sex outside of marriage, and increases the
possibility of having more children. (These communities don’t have a monopoly on encouraging young
marriage for religious reasons, of course; the same thing can be found in certain Jewish and Muslim
traditions.)”). But cf. Julie Zauzmer, Roy Moore Allegations Prompt Reflections on Fundamentalist
Culture in Which Some Christian Men Date Teens, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017, 1:57 PM), (“Randy
Brinson, an influential evangelical pastor who ran against Moore in his primary race in this election, said
that the evangelical Christians he knows in Alabama would generally not approve of . . . a relationship
[between a thirty-one-year-old man and a fourteen-year-old girl].”). For the general state of underage
marriage and the laws surrounding it, see TAHIRIH JUST. CTR., FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: HOW
LAWS ALLOW CHILD MARRIAGE TO HAPPEN IN TODAY’S AMERICA 2 (2017), http://www.tahirih.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/TahirihChildMarriageReport.pdf (listing only three states—Virginia, Texas,
and New York—that limit marriage to adults); Anjali Tsui, In Fight Over Child Marriage Laws, States
Resist Calls for a Total Ban, FRONTLINE (July 6, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/infight-over-child-marriage-laws-states-resist-calls-for-a-total-ban/ (“No state has gone as far as to bar
marriage for all minors, but three have come close: Texas, Virginia and New York.”). But see Zauzmer,
supra (“Every state allows youths under 18 to marry in certain circumstances, such as with parental
consent or judicial approval.”).
152
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underage party’s parents.154 Colorado, Mrs. Lovett’s place of business, is
one such state.155 Further, in Colorado, emancipation from one’s parents is
automatic once an underage person marries.156 And statutory rape laws do
not prohibit sex between married individuals.157 As such, Judge Turpin and
Joanna’s marriage fits within the legal parameters. In addition, because their
religion dictates unions of this kind, the state would be especially loath to
intervene.158 Mrs. Lovett nonetheless refuses to supply the cake, citing her
conscientious objection to underage marriage. Mrs. Lovett’s bakery is a
public accommodation and, like Mr. Phillips (the baker in Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado) she is subject to Colorado’s public accommodations
law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.159 Must Mrs.
Lovett, like Mr. Phillips, set conscience aside and provide the cake?
Notice the parallels between Mrs. Lovett’s and Mr. Phillips’s opposition
to providing service. Both respond to the nature of the marriage that is to be
celebrated: Mrs. Lovett opposes underage marriage and Mr. Phillips opposes
same-sex marriage. Mrs. Lovett might well have contended that she would
bake just about any celebration cake for members of Judge Turpin’s
religious community; she is just unwilling to contribute to an underage
marriage. In a similar vein, Mr. Phillips, along with other vendors who
oppose gay marriage,160 argues that his refusal is not directed at gay or
lesbian individuals; he would bake cakes for a gay person’s birthday, just
not for a same-sex marriage.161
Of course, Mrs. Lovett could say that her objection is to any form of
child marriage, not religious child marriage per se. She would refuse to
154

Zauzmer, supra note 153.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-108 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
156
A minor under the age of 16 may enter into a marriage so long as she has the consent of a legally
responsible parent and the approval of a judge, id. § 14-2-108(1), but only if the court makes a finding
that “the underage party is capable of assuming the responsibilities of marriage and the marriage would
serve the underage party’s best interests.” Id. § 14-2-108(2)(a). See also Colorado Legal Ages Law,
FINDLAW (Mar. 9, 2018), http://statelaws.findlaw.com/colorado-law/colorado-legal-ages-laws.html
(“Colorado doesn’t have an emancipation . . . statute. Emancipation generally occurs when a child
reaches the age of majority (21), but can occur earlier due to marriage . . . .”).
157
In general, “sex between a married couple in which at least one party is under the age of consent
cannot be prosecuted under the law.” CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2004). See generally Age of Consent & Sexual Abuse Laws Around the
World, AGEOFCONSENT.NET, https://www.ageofconsent.net/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (insert
explanatory parenthetical). In Colorado, marriage is a defense to a statutory rape charge. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
158
See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 39, at 285 (“[I]f the relevant religious community has norms
with respect to who may marry within its traditions—and virtually all traditions have such norms—the
state is disabled from substituting its judgment for that of the faith community on the content of those
religious norms.”).
159
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
160
See, e.g., Barronelle Stutzman, Why a Friend Is Suing Me: The Arlene’s Flowers Story, SEATTLE
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015, 4:23 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/why-a-good-friend-is-suing-methe-arlenes-flowers-story/.
161
Alex Swoyer, Supreme Court Case on Same-Sex Wedding Cakes: Artistic Expression vs. Civil
Rights, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/28/jack-phillipsargument-same-sex-wedding-cakes-set-/.
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supply a cake to a secular couple where there was a significant difference in
age between the two marrying parties, one of them was underage, and the
underage party did not consent. In that way, one might think Mrs. Lovett
could avoid a charge of religious discrimination. But the claim would be of
no avail: just as prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination entail
prohibitions on discrimination aimed at same-sex marriage, so too
prohibitions on religious discrimination would entail prohibitions on
discrimination aimed at religiously mandated (or promoted) marriage. One
cannot plausibly sustain a distinction between refusing someone because of
their religion and refusing to cater to a central aspect of their religion. Were
it otherwise, we would have to take at face value a baker’s claim that he
could not be charged with anti-Semitism for refusing to provide a cake for a
Bar or Bat Mitzvah since he would happily sell Jewish customers any of the
birthday cakes he keeps in stock.162
How ought the law respond to the claims of these bakers? On its face, it
looks to be difficult to distinguish the two. Nonetheless this Section aims to
argue that Mrs. Lovett may turn away Judge Turpin and his underage bride
even while Mr. Phillips may not refuse to provide cakes for gay weddings.
To begin, consider again the two cakes with anti-gay messages that
Azucar bakery refused to provide to William Jack. Recall that the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission held that Marjorie Silva, the owner of Azucar, did
not violate Colorado’s public accommodations law in refusing because Silva
would not have supplied anti-gay cakes to anyone.163 At the same time, the
Commission also held that Phillips, the baker in Masterpiece, did
discriminate impermissibly in refusing a wedding cake to the gay couple,
since the baker regularly sold wedding cakes to opposite-sex couples.164 In
other words, and in keeping with Equal Access, Silva merely chose the
products she would sell, while Phillips nefariously chose the people he
would serve.
I believe the Commission reached the right result, albeit for the wrong
reason. A better strategy would pick up on a different asymmetry between
the requests made of Silva and Phillips. Jack, the fundamentalist Christian
customer whom Silva turned away, sought a cake with a message
communicating animus toward gay and lesbian people. In contrast, the cake
Craig and Mullins sought from Phillips did not convey a message whose aim
was to denigrate religion. Craig and Mullins wanted a cake celebrating their
marriage. As such, their commission was not a true counterpart to William
Jack’s. The true counterpart to the cake Silva was asked to bake would instead

162
See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that discrimination against same-sex marriage
is discrimination against sexual orientation). See also infra text accompanying note 178.
163
Corvino, supra note 113.
164
Id.
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have been a cake with one or more religious figures X-ed out or a cake with a
message from a venerated source decrying religion or religious individuals.165
Recognizing the distinction between these commissions points the way
to a more general policy: commercial enterprises may, in the spirit of “hate
has no home here,” refuse commissions communicating hate. Indeed,
Marjorie Silva, the baker who refused to supply the cakes with anti-gay
biblical language, described her reasoning in just this way: “If [a customer]
wants to hate people, he can hate them not here in my bakery.”166 Or to put
the policy in more general terms: businesses may refuse to supply goods or
services that would be used in projects promoting animus toward individuals
or groups on the basis of their protected characteristics.167
Because animus is the only justifiable predicate for a refusal of service
that would otherwise target a protected class, the policy offers ready
protection for same-sex couples who would seek goods or services for their
weddings.168 A marrying same-sex couple expresses each member’s love for
the other. As such, the policy would not countenance a refusal to serve a
same-sex couple, however conscientious that refusal was.
But what about serving individuals who do seek to promote hate?
Consider a case where someone who is not a member of a protected class
seeks a good or service for a project promoting hate—for example, a
Neo-Nazi approaches an African American baker to order a cake denigrating
African Americans for an upcoming Neo-Nazi convention. Now consider
the distribution of entitlements. The state cannot, consistent with the First
Amendment, prohibit Neo-Nazis from undertaking their activities, however
hostile to minority races and religions those activities may be.169 At the same
time, in virtually no jurisdiction would Neo-Nazis be taken to be members
of a protected class.170 On a narrow reading of public accommodations
165
For this reason, Phillips’s lawyer before the Supreme Court was just mistaken when she
contended that the Free Speech Clause “protects the lesbian graphic designer who doesn’t want to design
for the Westboro Baptist Church, as much as it protects Mr. Phillips.” Gay Wedding Cake Meets Faith
at U.S. Supreme Court, RICHMOND FREE PRESS (Dec. 8, 2017, 6:56 AM), http://m.richmondfreepress.c
om/news/2017/dec/08/gay-wedding-cake-meets-faith-us-supreme-court/. The Westboro Baptist Church
promotes hate; marrying gay couples do not.
166
Todd Starnes, Colorado Double Standard: Bakers Should Not Be Forced to Make Anti-Gay
Cakes, FOX NEWS (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/colorado-double-standard-bakersshould-not-be-forced-to-make-anti-gay-cakes.
167
Ought the principle apply to animus not based on protected characteristics? I am inclined to say
yes. A baker might reasonably refuse to bake a cake for a party of the “we-hate-fat-people club,” or even
for a party dissing her favorite sports team. Within the confines of this Article, however, I restrict the
defense of the “hate has no home here” policy to hate directed toward members of protected classes
because of their protected characteristics. I seek to leverage the converging aims of refusals of service
for these projects and anti-discrimination laws. I leave a defense of a broader hate-based exemption
policy for another day.
168
See supra note 12 for examples of pending or decided wedding vendor cases.
169
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (vindicating the right of the KKK
to hold events promoting hate so long as those events did not prompt “imminent lawless action”).
170
Seattle’s public accommodations law is unusual insofar as it includes “political ideology” among
the impermissible grounds of discrimination in places of public accommodation. Civil Rights
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statutes, where they protect only members with the enumerated characteristics,
the baker could freely turn the Neo-Nazi away on any grounds.171
On the other hand, a more expansive reading of public accommodations
laws would require service for “[a]ll persons,”172 with protected classes
enumerated to identify not an exclusive list of people against whom
businesses may not discriminate—again, anti-discrimination norms apply to
everyone on this reading—but instead to underscore that it is especially
wrong to discriminate against members of historically disadvantaged
groups.173 On this reading, the public accommodations law protects the
Neo-Nazi, all else equal. The important point to note is that, when a putative
customer desires a product or service for the purposes of promoting hate, all
is not equal.
We saw in Part I that it is not unreasonable for a vendor to see herself as
implicated morally in the projects to which a customer will put the good or
service the vendor provides. The fact that she would feel complicit is not a
sufficient reason to exempt her from a requirement to serve. But the law has
special reason to attend to conscientious objections to serving customers
who are engaged in hate promotion, especially where the targets of that hate
include the very individuals whom anti-discrimination laws seek to protect.
After all, there is something awkward, if not also counterproductive and
even perverse, in having an anti-discrimination law compel someone, like
our African American baker, to help further the Neo-Nazis’ project of
directing animus toward his own people. By contrast, when the African
American baker excludes the Neo-Nazi, he is acting in a way that is
continuous with the aims of the law that the civil rights commission is
empowered to enforce. If refusals of service are permissible anywhere, they
should be permissible here.
To get a better handle on the scope of permissible refusals, consider,
first, that the result would be the same whether or not the cake the Neo-Nazi
requested contained a message. The baker could reasonably see himself as
promoting hate were the Neo-Nazi to have asked him for nothing but
Enforcement, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/civilrights/civil-rights (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
To the extent that Neo-Nazism constitutes a political ideology, our baker might be out of luck in Seattle.
Elsewhere, he is free to turn the Neo-Nazi away. For an exhaustive list of public accommodations statutes
extending beyond the traditional suspect classes, see Sepper, supra note 39, at 639 n.25.
171
Gingerich, supra note 137, at 457.
172
Civil Rights Act of 1974, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
173
I am grateful to Seana Shiffrin for pointing me to this distinction. Joseph Singer urges something
similar in No Right, supra note 6, at 1412–16. The view can be traced back to William Blackstone: “[I]f
an inn-keeper, or other victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his house for travelers, it is an implied
engagement to entertain all persons who travel that way . . . .” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 166 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1902); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 296 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Underlying the congressional discussions, and at the heart
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection, was the assumption that the State by
statute or by ‘the good old common law’ was obligated to guarantee all citizens access to places of public
accommodation.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 AM. L.
REV. 609, 615 (1879) (discussing “the general obligation of those exercising a public or ‘common’
business to practi[c]e their art on demand”).
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unadorned, generic baked goods for the Neo-Nazi convention.174 Second,
any baker, of any skin color, race, ethnicity, and so on, could exercise the
right in question. Everyone has the right to refuse to promote hate.
Insofar as the Neo-Nazi case does not involve a customer who is a
member of a protected class, that case is a relatively easy one. But suppose
now that our Neo-Nazi is replaced by an adherent of Christian Identity, a
KKK group that subscribes to “a unique anti[-S]emitic and racist
theology.”175 For this KKK member, hate is mandated by his religion.176 And
suppose further that this KKK member approaches the same African
American baker, this time requesting a generic cake for a Christian Identity
KKK event. This looks to pose a problem for the baker’s ability to oppose
the commission. Would turning the KKK member away constitute
impermissible discrimination on the basis of religion?
One thought would be to have the baker insist that he is not denying
service because of the KKK member’s religion, but instead because of the
event at which the KKK member would serve the cake—again, a KKK
convention. But we have already seen that a similar strategy is unavailing
for the wedding vendor who would deny service to a same-sex couple177—
there is no distinguishing status from conduct where the status mandates the
conduct or the conduct embodies the status.178
Here is a different way of arguing that the Christian KKK case is not
relevantly different from the secular Neo-Nazi case. Both parties are
engaged in the same conduct—the promotion of white supremacy. If the
state were to treat the two cases differently, because of the KKK’s
connection to religion, one could charge the state with an Establishment
Clause violation.179 Or one might see in the state’s more favorable treatment
of the Christian KKK member a violation of a principle of “equal regard,”180
which holds that “no members of our political community ought to be
devalued on account of the spiritual [or non-spiritual] foundations of their
important commitments and projects.”181 On either way of understanding
what the state may permissibly do, the result in the Christian KKK case may
not be different from the result reached in the Neo-Nazi case. So, if the

174

Cf. Stolzenberg, supra note 66, at 748.
Christian Identity, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremistfiles/ideology/christian-identity (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
176
See, e.g., supra note 17.
177
See supra text accompanying note 162.
178
See supra notes 130 and 162.
179
See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
343, 356–61 (2014); Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare and Religion and Arguing Off
the Wall, SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013, 2:32 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/11/obamacarebirth-control-mandate-lawsuit-how-a-radical-argument-went-mainstream.html.
180
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 124, at 1282–1288.
181
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 4 (2007).
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vendor may refuse to provide the cake for the Neo-Nazi convention, then the same
logic permits him to refuse to provide the cake for the Christian KKK convention.
The foregoing offers a principle that, unlike Equal Access, does not
begin and end with whether the vendor offers a particular kind of good to
one customer but not another. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the
vendor can credibly claim that he does not wish to support a particular
project. That is, conscientious businesses may attend to the uses to which
their goods and services will be put. And on the thought that “hate has no
home here,” in conjunction with the ethos of anti-discrimination laws, the
state may permit conscientious vendors to refuse to supply their goods or
services for projects involving hate.
I want to take the additional step of enlarging the understanding of hate
that can serve as a predicate for refusing service. The relevant notion of hate
should encompass not just events whose explicit aim is an assertion or
celebration of the supremacy of one identity-based group relative to another,
but also those that have the effect of creating or perpetuating supremacy.
Therein lie the seeds of Mrs. Lovett’s right to turn away Judge Turpin and
his underage bride.
Underage marriage is a tool for the oppression of women. In the vast
majority of these unions, the husband is an adult and the wife is a minor. She
is frequently below the age of consent, so her consent is not sought; instead,
as we have seen, a parent or judge will substitute their consent for hers.182
Even where a state does recognize her consent, we might worry that that
consent is not meaningful because of her youth. In many of these unions, the
wife is young enough that, were her husband to have had sex with her before
they were married, he could have been charged with statutory rape.183 So the
unconsented-to marriage transforms sexual assault into a non-offense.
Further, in many states, the wife—while deemed old enough to marry—is
not yet old enough to retain a lawyer or represent herself in court in order to
seek a divorce.184 It is not difficult to see how these arrangements would
satisfy at least some definitions of domination.185
One might contend that in many of these cases, the couple’s religion
commands or at least encourages the marriage. In such cases, neither the
182

See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, 11 Years Old, a Mom, and Pushed to Marry Her Rapist in
Florida, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/opinion/sunday/it-wasforced-on-me-child-marriage-in-the-us.html.
184
See, e.g., Charlotte Alter, Why It’s Still Legal for Underage Girls to Marry in the U.S., TIME
(June 1, 2017, 5:39 AM), https://time.com/4800808/why-its-still-legal-for-underage-girls-to-marry-inthe-u-s/.
185
See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 31–33 (1990). Marci
Hamilton, a children’s rights advocate, has forcefully condemned fundamentalist religious communities
in which the boys are “groomed to be rapists” while the young girls are “groomed to be victims,” and
where men engage in polygamous marriages with underage girls. Marci Hamilton, Why the Texas
Supreme Court’s Ruling Regarding the FLDS Mothers Is Significantly More Protective of the Children
183
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couple nor the community views the marriage as an assertion of male
supremacy, or at least not in the invidious way that the term generally tracks.
While outsiders might construe it as oppressive—perhaps even as a form of
female bondage186—that is not how the couple, or their community, views it.187
It should not be surprising that the community views these marriages as
benign. If the religion’s acknowledged purpose were instead, for example,
to enslave the community’s female members, the state might well step in to
prevent this form of religious exercise.188 But it is hardly fanciful or
intolerant for someone who does not share the community’s beliefs to find
underage marriage troubling, any more than it would be intolerant to
condemn a religious group’s promotion of murder even if murder were
mandated by the group’s authoritative religious texts.189
The question then is whether the state may compel those who oppose
underage marriage to foster it, whether by contributing to underage
weddings or in some other way. The answer, I think, is this: as with the
Christian KKK commission, the fact that the oppressive activity has a
religious basis makes no difference to Mrs. Lovett’s rights. Mrs. Lovett can
forswear selling cakes to any couple with an underage bride—were Jerry
Lee Lewis to have entered her store requesting a cake for his upcoming
nuptials to his thirteen-year-old fiancée, Mrs. Lovett would have refused him
too. And if Judge Turpin, now betrothed to a fifteen-year-old boy, were to
request a wedding cake from Jack Phillips, Phillips would be well within his
rights to refuse the commission—so long as his refusal was based on the
youth of the betrothed and not the sexual orientation of the couple.
To summarize the proposed policy so far: no business may discriminate
on the basis of a protected characteristic. But the law should permit an
exception for businesses that choose to deny service to any individual or
group that would use the business’s wares for a project or event directing
hate toward members of a protected class because of their protected

Involved Than the Media Have Painted It to Be, FINDLAW (June 3, 2008),
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/why-the-texas-supreme-courts-ruling-regarding-theflds-mothers-is-significantly-more-protective-of-the-children-involved-than-the-media-have-painted-itto-be.html.
186
See generally Ajwang’ Warria, Forced Child Marriages as a Form of Child Trafficking, 79
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 274 (2017) (likening child marriage to “[a] life of bondage”).
187
For a literary example on this point, see ATWOOD, supra note 13 (describing the anticipation of
a young girl over her upcoming nuptials to a prominent, older man, against the backdrop of a religious
society whose oppression Atwood aims to condemn).
188
Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“[I]f a wife religiously believed it was
her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the
civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?”).
189
Cf. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions and Third-Party Harms, 17 FED. SOC’Y REV. 50, 58
(2016), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/religious-exemptions-and-third-party-harms (“No one
argues today that religious freedom shields acts causing such basic harms” as “murder, rape, [and] theft.”).
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characteristics.190 I leave open the question of whether the law should permit
other refusals of service.
Further, and importantly, unlike the question of whether the vendor
would take herself to be complicit, the question of what counts as “hate” is
one the state has the prerogative to answer. That is, the vendor can judge a
particular event as hate-promoting, and she can decide, as a matter of
conscience, whether she wants to contribute to it. But if she refuses, the state
should countenance her refusal on the policy proposed here only if the event
for which her goods or services are sought would assert or perpetuate the
inferiority of a protected class. That way of formulating the policy echoes
the construction of anti-subordination that the Supreme Court has
articulated,191 as well as the one used by the federal government when
prosecuting hate crimes.192
Notice that the difference between the policy articulated here and Equal
Access is not merely that the former permits some refusals of service in order
to avoid felt complicity in hate or oppression while the latter would not. It
is, more significantly, that the policy defended here is, in fact, more
consonant with anti-discrimination norms than Equal Access. Recall that
Equal Access prohibits a vendor from denying one customer a product if the
vendor would be willing to sell that product to a different customer.193
However, the policy here takes sameness of the product to be irrelevant, and
respect for equality to be paramount. Thus, if a vendor is willing to provide
a wedding cake for a secular underage marriage, she may not refuse a
190
Putting the principle in this way naturally raises the question of whether the owner of the Red
Hen restaurant was within her rights to eject Sarah Huckabee Sanders, President Trump’s press secretary.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The Red Hen’s owner later explained that “[s]everal Red Hen
employees are gay . . . . They knew Sanders had defended Trump’s desire to bar transgender people from
the military. This month, they had all watched her evade questions and defend a Trump policy that caused
migrant children to be separated from their parents.” Avi Selk & Sarah Murray, The Owner of the Red
Hen Explains Why She Asked Sarah Huckabee Sanders to Leave, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018, 5:24 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2018/06/23/why-a-small-town-restaurant-ownerasked-sarah-huckabee-sanders-to-leave-and-would-do-it-again/. In the restaurant owner’s mind, refusing
service was a matter of conscientious conviction. It was not however the kind of refusal that would fall
under the policy as articulated here since Sanders was not seeking the food in the service of the activities
that the owner opposes. I allow that the principle might receive a broader articulation that would cover
the Red Hen owner’s refusal, but I do not seek to defend that broader application here.
191
The language here is loosely based on the test for impermissible sex-based discrimination in
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996), which forthrightly offers “an asymmetrical antisubordination test.” Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia:
Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 402
(1999). The language also echoes the Court’s finding in Brown v. Board of Education that “the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.” 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954). For canonical works on anti-subordination, see Fiss, supra note 109, at 157–64; Reva B.
Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex,
Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1058–66 (1986).
192
Katie Mettler, Why SPLC Says White Lives Matter is a Hate Group but Black Lives Matter is
Not, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2016, 6:20 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2016/08/31/splc-the-much-cited-designator-of-hate-groups-explains-why-white-lives-matteris-one/.
193
See supra notes 5, 6, and 21 (providing paradigmatic statements of the principle).
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wedding cake for a religious underage marriage. By contrast, if she refuses
to participate in the oppression that underage marriage perpetuates, the state
should grant her an exemption from its anti-discrimination laws, since her
refusal is consonant with the values underpinning those laws. The fact that
the vendor routinely sells wedding cakes to couples each of whose members
is of age is of no moment whatsoever.
There will of course be difficult cases. May a fabric seller refuse to sell
black fabric to a Muslim woman who would use it to make a burka?194 May
a vegan camping store owner refuse to sell a knife to an adherent of Santeria
who will use the knife in animal sacrifice rituals?195 The difficulty of
determining whether these cases involve hate of the right kind is akin to the
difficulty of identifying what counts as hate speech.196 Importantly, though,
these worries concern the outer bounds of the category of “hate.” The
concept of hate has a core that is much more ready to hand. I take it to be
uncontroversial that any activity aimed at denigrating members of a
protected class so qualifies197 and I intend for the account I have advanced
to apply to the core cases in the first instance. Clarifying the full scope of
“hate” will have to wait another day.
D. The Place of Hate in the State’s Work
Borrowing from the public rhetoric, I shall call the policy just articulated
Hate Has No Home Here (HHNHH). That policy allows vendors to refuse
to contribute their wares to projects that would direct hate to protected
groups. So far, I have discussed HHNHH as it arises for the private
enterprise acting in its own right. But what of the state, or private entities
acting on its behalf? Can the state or its agents deny goods or services to

194
Reasonable minds can of course differ on the question of whether the burka is oppressive. For
the view that it is, see, for example, Terri Murray, Why Feminists Should Oppose the Burqa, NEW
HUMANIST (June 26, 2013), https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/4199/why-feminists-should-opposethe-burqa. For the view that it is not, see, for example, Raifa Rafiq, Neither Oppressed Nor Trailblazing,
Muslim Women Need to Be Heard, GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.theguardian.co
m/commentisfree/2019/mar/08/muslim-women-representation-media-politics.
195
Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–47 (1993)
(overturning, on First Amendment grounds, a Hialeah ordinance prohibiting the ritual slaughter of
animals).
196
See generally Adèle Hutton Auxier, Note, Tiptoeing Through the Junkyard: Three Approaches
to the Moral Dilemma of Racist Hate Speech, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 215, 221–24
(2007) (surveying different theories).
197
More expansively, one could have a policy allowing refusals of service for a set list of hatebased organizations. I would be prepared to adopt the Southern Poverty Law Center’s list, but others
might dispute some of its entries. See David Montgomery, The State of Hate, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2018/11/08/feature/is-the-southern-poverty-lawcenter-judging-hate-fairly/ (highlighting the difficulty in defining hate by exploring the different
viewpoints between SPLC and other organizations on its list of active hate groups). Again, the aim for
now is not to arrive at a definitive list but to advance the general idea that hate can serve as a permissible
basis for exclusion, leaving the scope of “hate” for future articulation.
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those who pursue hate-promoting endeavors? For example, could a foster
agency refuse to certify the parental fitness of a Christian Identity KKK couple?198
The answer seems to turn on whether whatever the state or its agent is
offering is something to which the hate-promoting patron is presumptively
entitled. On the one hand, we know that the state need not confer benefits on
hate-based endeavors. Thus, for example, it can deny tax-exempt status to
entities that engage in invidious discrimination.199 But can it, or its agents,
deny goods or services to which individuals or entities would otherwise be
entitled simply on the ground that these individuals or entities promote hate?
Two lines of precedent suggest that they may not deny these goods and
services as a categorical matter; on the other hand, a sufficiently compelling
reason in the face of an individualized assessment could justify the refusal.
In the first set of cases—relevant to the Fulton context—courts consider
whether the state or its agents may refuse to certify as foster parents
individuals who believe that homosexuality or nontraditional gender
identities are sinful. In Blais v. Hunter, for example, a federal district court
in Washington suggested that this set of beliefs—even if religiously
motivated—could disqualify the individuals who hold them.200 But it also
insisted that holding these beliefs could not function as an automatic bar;
instead, the disqualification may result only from a strict First Amendment
balancing test that “tips sharply in . . . favor” of the foster-parent applicant.201
The second set of cases involves the rights of prison inmates to practice
white supremacist religions. For a recent example, consider Fox v.
Washington, a suit brought by two inmates of a Michigan prison who are
Christian Identity adherents and who challenge the Michigan Department of
Prison’s refusal to provide them with a dedicated space for their own
worship services.202 The Department had refused because it had concluded
that the prisoners’ religious freedom interests could be satisfied were the
prisoners to attend the religious services of other groups that the prison
already hosted,203 and it worried that providing a dedicated space for
Christian Identity worship would pose a security risk at the prison.204 While
a district court decision upheld the Department’s refusal, the Sixth Circuit
vacated and remanded because it held that the refusal “substantially

198

Cf. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19–123; supra Section II.B_.
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding a denial of the
university’s tax-exempt status because the University prohibits miscegenation, tax exemption should be
enjoyed only by those entities that serve a public purpose, and an entity that discriminates acts contrary
to public policy and so cannot be serving a public purpose).
200
See, e.g., Blais v. Hunter, No. 2:20-cv-00187-SMJ, 2020 WL 5960687, at *12 (E.D. Wa. Oct.
18, 2020) (“[T]he Court does not enjoin the Department from taking LGBTQ+ considerations into
account when reviewing foster care license applications.”).
201
Id.
202
949 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2020).
203
See id. at 275–76.
204
Id.
199
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burdened” the prisoners’ religious rights.205 Importantly, in arriving at this
holding, the Sixth Circuit not only recognized that adherents of Christian
Identity believe in “racial separatism”—its adherents may not worship with
non-white individuals206—it also relied on that belief to establish that the
prison’s refusal to allow them to practice apart from non-whites constituted
a substantial burden. In other words, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
refusal to host worship services that the court explicitly recognized as
“racist”207 could constitute a violation of prisoners’ religious freedom rights.
Fox v. Washington bestows more deference on the Christian Identity
adherents than is necessary, or perhaps even permissible.208 The Sixth
Circuit might have sought to distance itself from the prisoners’ racist
convictions. Government actors may do so consistent with the tenets of
liberalism.209 Indeed, it may be that they must disavow racism or other
invidious forms of discrimination as part and parcel of their obligation to
secure robust equality for all.210
It is also worth noting that even while Blais and Fox demonstrate great
legal deference toward religious convictions that promote hate, that
deference need not be absolute. In both cases, the government could have
denied the accommodation so long as it could have proffered a compelling
reason not to accede, and demonstrated that refusing to accede was the least
restrictive way to serve that reason.211
More generally, the distinction between public agencies and private
commercial entities goes to where the presumption lies, but not ultimately
to whether each may in some cases refuse service – both may do so. It is just
that the state or its agents may not adopt categorical rules about whom they
will or will not serve. Instead, the state or its agents must conduct a searching
inquiry into whether the party seeking service would in fact promote hate in
a way that unavoidably interferes with the state’s compelling interest. By
205

Id. at 282.
Id. at 280.
207
The Sixth Circuit described Christian Identity as “explicitly racist.” Id. at 273. The Southern
Poverty Law Center has also identified Christian Identity as a racist organization. See supra note 197.
208
Cf. Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court Nears the Moment of Truth on Religion,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/opinion/supreme-court-religion.html
(arguing that the Sixth Circuit was compelled by prior mistaken religious freedom cases to rule as it did).
209
The Court did just this in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), when it recognized that anti-discrimination laws were “well within the State's
usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of
discrimination. . . .” Id. at 571–72.
210
See, e.g., Corey Brettschneider, How Should Liberal Democracies Respond to Faith Based
Groups That Advocate Discrimination? State Funding and Nonprofit Status, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 72, 74–75 (Austin
Sarat, ed., 2012) (describing “democratic persuasion,” or the state’s responsibility to counter freedom of
expression with efforts to explain why discriminatory viewpoints “are inconsistent with a respect for free
and equal citizenship”). Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (“[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education. . . .”).
211
Both cases undertake a strict scrutiny analysis. See Blais v. Hunter, No. 2:20-cv-00187-SMJ,
2020 WL 5960687, at *10–11 (E.D. Wa. Oct. 18, 2020) ; Fox, 949 F.3d at 282–283.
206
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contrast, private businesses may refuse service to anyone involved in a hatebased project.
While the HHNHH policy I have advanced cannot, then, operate as
readily in the domain of public services as in private commerce, the
government could in some cases refuse to lend its—or the public’s—
resources to the promotion of hate. And indeed, if the government adopted
the robust egalitarianism described above, it would see that there is often—
perhaps even always—a compelling reason to refuse to promote hate.212
IV. VENDOR REFUSALS AND STATE ACTION
We have just seen that there are limits on the state’s, or its agents’,
refusal to provide service to individuals or entities where they seek the
service in question for a project promoting hate. In particular, neither the
state nor its agents may categorically refuse to provide goods or services on
the basis of the would-be patron’s protected characteristics, even when those
characteristics are inextricably bound up with hate-promoting projects (as
with the adherent of the Christian Identity KKK). At first glance, the
situation looked to be different for private commercial enterprises that do
not act as agents of the state. I argued that under HHNHH, a commercial
vendor could refuse to serve anyone who would use the vendor’s wares in a
hate-promoting project. Still, one might wonder whether there is problematic
state action if the state merely permits a private business to, say, turn away
the Christian Identity KKK patron. Might these refusals involve the state in
promoting some viewpoints and frustrating others? After all, the state would
not permit a business to turn away, say, a Christian group seeking goods or
services for a widely-celebrated Christian holiday (e.g., Christmas, Easter)
or even a church-specific event that promoted Christianity but did not
denigrate other religions or groups.
The problem, generally stated, is this: HHNHH allows messages
celebrating a protected class but not those denigrating a protected class. In
that way, it looks perilously similar to the policy the Supreme Court rejected
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, where it overturned a St. Paul ordinance
criminalizing cross burning.213 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, decried
the ordinance because, by his lights, it discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint:
Displays containing some words—odious racial epithets, for
example—would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But
“fighting words” that do not themselves invoke race, color,
creed, religion, or gender—aspersions upon a person’s mother,
for example—would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the
212
Cf. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity, supra note 57, at 1929 (arguing that courts should
rarely defer to religious beliefs that would express animus toward protected groups).
213
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc.,
tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those
speakers’ opponents. One could hold up a sign saying, for
example, that all “anti-Catholic bigots” are misbegotten; but
not that all “papists” are . . . .214
The passage advances two different complaints about the ordinance. The
first two quoted sentences rail against a policy that would condemn people
on the basis of protected characteristics but not on other grounds that might
be just as hurtful (e.g., inveighing against the target’s mother). That is a real
distinction though not an embarrassing one, once one appreciates that
protected characteristics are protected precisely because of their
subordinating social meaning.215 (And at any rate, virtually everyone has a
mother, putting all of the fighting firebrands on equal footing.)
The Court’s second complaint is that the St. Paul ordinance would
permit signs condemning “anti-Catholic bigots” but not “papists.” Here too
the distinction is real but defensible as a moral matter (even if not as a
constitutional matter). There is a moral difference between speakers bent on
bigotry (the anti-Catholics are “bigots”) and those engaging in benign
religious devotion (the “papists”). Justice Scalia needed to argue that the
ordinance would condemn anti-Catholic bigots but not, e.g., anti-Protestant
bigots to make his point that the ordinance engaged in morally problematic
viewpoint discrimination. And, importantly, the HHNHH policy does not
produce that form of discrimination as it allows businesses to turn away
bigots of any stripe.216
Yet even if HHNHH’s asymmetries can be defended on moral grounds,
R.A.V. still evokes a constitutional worry. That worry takes two forms: First,
does the First Amendment allow the state to enshrine a policy that treats
projects promoting hate differently from those promoting toleration (e.g.,
allowing businesses to turn away anti-gay commissions but not gay-activist
commissions)? Second, even if the state may do so, is the state

214

Id. at 391–92.
See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
216
In dissent, Justice Stevens aims to attack Justice Scalia’s on different grounds.
215

The response to a sign saying that “all [religious] bigots are misbegotten” is a sign
saying that “all advocates of religious tolerance are misbegotten.” Assuming such
signs could be fighting words (which seems to me extremely unlikely), neither sign
would be banned by the ordinance, for the attacks were not “based on . . . religion”
but rather on one’s beliefs about tolerance.
Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (alterations in original). Justice Stevens has
unhelpfully changed the hypothetical. For one thing, he is right that neither of his signs contains fighting
words and indeed both should be permitted. For another, Justice Stevens has not made the epithets
specific to a particular protected group and it was the ordinance’s differential treatment of protected
groups that led to its infirmity. Indeed, that is the right way to see the problem with the ordinance—not
as viewpoint discrimination but as an equality violation.
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constitutionally empowered to determine what counts as “hate”? I
address each worry in turn.
On the policy advocated here, the state may permit storeowners to turn
away those with supremacist messages (i.e., “we’re-better-than-you”) but
not those with equality-insisting messages (i.e., “we’re-just-as-good-as-you”).
But that differential treatment is precisely what rendered the ordinance in
R.A.V. constitutionally infirm. To motivate the worry, imagine that a
Christian Identity KKK member seeks the services of a photocopy shop for
purposes of producing leaflets he will distribute at a white supremacist rally.
If viewpoint discrimination is an issue at all, it will be much more acute
where the requested good involves printed words rather than a generic
product, like an unadorned cake. If the state protects the shop owner’s right
to refuse service, would this count as an undue state restriction on speech?
To be sure, the state is not prohibiting the white supremacist speech. Nor
is the state mandating that printing shops refuse to publish white supremacist
speech. Nor, finally, is the state preferring the printer’s message over the
white supremacist’s. The printer is not disseminating any message in
refusing service. No one other than the customer need know the grounds of
her refusal, or even that she refused service in the first place.217
But one might still worry that state action sustaining the rights of
printing shops to refuse service because the printed material would express
a particular set of viewpoints constitutes an impermissible restriction on
speech. The state appears to be acting in a way that impairs dissemination of
some viewpoints but not others—assuming, for example, that the printer
could not refuse service to a Black advocacy or gay Pride group.218
Does the state impermissibly favor the printer’s anti-white supremacy
stance in finding that the printer has permissibly refused service? I do not
think so. The state sustains the printer’s right to withhold her energies from
promoting hate, but it does not do so because of the particular brand of hate
the printer refuses to serve. So long as the state would have been just as
willing to sustain the rights of a printer to withhold printing services from,
say, a Black supremacist group, then it does not act in order to promote or
impede particular viewpoints.
Still, in virtue of permitting printers to turn anyone away on ideological
grounds, one might worry that the state is limiting the diversity of views
made available for others’ consideration.219 A few thoughts in response.
217
Cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974) (identifying among the criteria for
something to count as speech that its message be readily discernable by an audience).
218
I take it that neither of these operates with a supremacist ideology—i.e., each seeks to affirm its
equal, not superior, moral worth relative to all others.
219
Cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1919, 1940 (2006) (“One may also argue that the government must treat all viewpoints as equal
in the eyes of the law, at least where private speech . . . is involved, because the government must remain
subservient to, rather than dominant over, public opinion.”); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
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First, if this is a genuine and widely felt concern, citizens of the state can
advocate to have “ideology” included as one of the categories that the state’s
public accommodations laws specifically protect.220 Second, even if the
effect of these refusals is to reduce the variety of views citizens encounter,221
one could deny that state action produced this reduction in just the same way
that the Court denies that there is state action in, say, school voucher cases.222
There, the claim is that the state does not impermissibly support religion
even if it permits parents to use vouchers for religious school tuition since it
is the parents themselves who have chosen the place of education for their
children.223 By the same token, one could claim here that the state does not
impermissibly restrict the number of ideological views on offer or the
relative prominence of those views since it is the printers themselves who
choose which views they will or will not publish.
So the state may in principle sustain vendors’ rights to refuse to
contribute to hate-promoting projects and its doing so need not constitute
state action. A second worry remains, however, insofar as HHNHH allows
the state to determine what counts as hate.224 There could indeed be
something troubling about having the state engage in these kinds of
determinations. As the Court rightly found in Masterpiece, whether a vendor
permissibly turns someone away “cannot be based on the government’s own
assessment of offensiveness.”225 But I suspect that there is a meaningful
difference between offensiveness and hate, as the latter is defined here. An
offensiveness determination is unavoidably subjective—something is
offensive just if it gives offense, which is to say, just if an audience finds it
to be offensive.226 On the other hand, a determination that some activity
asserts or perpetuates the inferior status of a protected group, which is what

U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (“[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal
Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found
to have become involved in it.”).
220
Seattle’s public accommodations ordinance does just this. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
221
The possibility that the variety of views on offer might be diminished was far more plausible in,
for example, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, where the Court had to contend with the scarce resource
of broadcast frequencies. 395 U.S. 367, 369–72 (1969). By contrast, the prospect of diminished access
to particular viewpoints from a policy that permits printing shop owners to deny service on non-identity
based grounds seems far more unlikely today, where social media can accommodate all speakers.
222
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002) (finding that the state
program at issue was “neutral in all respects toward religion” and “a program of true private choice”).
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HHNHH contemplates,227 need not be subjective. After all, hate crimes laws
are formulated to target just this kind of activity.228
In sum, there would be no problematic state action where the state
allowed private enterprises to deny service for projects that promoted hate
because the decision to turn the patron away would rest with the enterprise
alone. Nor need the state engage in problematic viewpoint discrimination in
defining “hate” for HHNHH; that definition could just be the one used in
hate crimes laws across the country.
CONCLUSION
On the proposal that I have been advancing, public accommodations
may not refuse service to individuals because of their protected
characteristics, no matter the assault on conscience that compelled service
might wage. With that said, and consistent with the sympathetic construction
of complicity and the conscientious model I offered in Part I, vendors need
not support others’ hate-promoting projects, even if those projects are rooted
in the values or activities or commitments of protected groups.
I have aimed to argue that there is in fact no conflict between equality
and refusing service to those who seek a vendor’s products for hateful ends.
Those ends are themselves equality-undermining, so, if anything, vendors
vindicate equality when they refuse to contribute to them. I want to end by
considering how we might treat vendors with conscientious objections to
non-hate-based projects, and to suggest that we offer them more compassion
than advocates of Equal Access might support.
Here is the general thought: public accommodation laws confer a
rhetorical advantage on the customers they protect. These customers cannot
be ejected from a place of business simply on the basis of their possessing a
protected characteristic. Privileged to stay, they might as well engage in a
civil dialogue with the owner who would otherwise turn them away.
Hopefully these dialogues would produce a compromise; at the very least,
they might humanize the parties on each side. To be sure, the customer
always retains the power to compel service or else file a legal complaint. But
the customer’s power to hold the vendor to the vendor’s legal obligations
should function as a backstop. There is much more to be gained from
compassionate engagement than civil rights bullying.229 And the market, far
from being a sphere reduced to profit and profanity, might just be a place
where conscience, compassion, and civil rights can all prosper.
227
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